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Active Rationality in Judicial Review
Richard Delgado*
The requirement that laws be rationall-that they make
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. The author
gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals who read
drafts of this Article, who offered insights, comments, or criticism, or who sim-
ply encouraged him to think more deeply about the idea of rationality: Robert
Aronson, Scott Bice, Richard Cleva, Theodore Eisenberg, Kenneth Karst, Mar-
garet Radin, Neal Roberts, Michael Shapiro, Steve Shiffrin, Catherine Smith,
and Stephen Yeazell. I am also indebted to my research assistants, Barbara
Biles and Bud Zerboni, for their work in the early stages of the Article's devel-
opment.
1. The rationality requirement is most often identified with the doctrine
of substantive due process. This doctrine commands that "a law bear a rational
relation to a constitutionally permissible objective [and that the law produce]
effects that advance, rather than retard or have no bearing on, the attainment
of the objective." P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrTUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
1004 (1975). See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (due process clause
"affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of 'liberty,' but
likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restric-
tions by the State"). Judicial consideration of the rationality of legislative clas-
sifications is central to equal protection analysis as well. See, e.g., Mathews v.
De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (equal protection clause requires invalida-
tion of classification that is "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment"); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("courts
must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a
statute are reasonable in light of its purpose"). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 16-2, at 994 (1978) ("The Supreme Court, from its earli-
est examination of socioeconomic regulation, has considered that equal protec-
tion demands reasonableness in legislative and administrative
classifications."). In addition, the two primary tests for cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the eighth amendment embody rationality requirements. The
excessiveness test prohibits forms of punishment that serve no penal purpose
more effectively than less severe punishment, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968), while the proportionality test prohibits punishments
that are grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the crime, see Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 371 (1910); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 421-23, 503
P.2d 921, 927-29, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 223-25 (1973). Courts also have questioned
the rationality of certain irrebuttable statutory presumptions. See, e.g., Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). See generally Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
In the cases of both substantive due process and equal protection, the ra-
tionality requirement controls regardless of whether the level of scrutiny em-
ployed by the court is that of deferential rational basis review, see, e.g., United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); L. TRIBE, supra, § 16-3, at 996 (deferential test
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sense 2-- is one of our most pervasive and insistent constitu-
tional guarantees. 3 Invoking the rationality requirement, courts
have struck down statutes, both civil and penal, that were
found to lack rationality at the time of their enactment, 4 or that
proved to be irrational in light of later-acquired information.5
equivalent to a presumption of legislative regularity or constitutionality); strict
scrutiny review, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (strict
scrutiny triggered by deprivation of a fundamental right); Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (strict scrutiny
triggered by law that adversely affects suspect class); or intermediate means-
end review, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives"). See also L. TABE, supra,
§§ 16-30 to -32, at 1082-97; Gunther, supra, at 21-48.
2. For a discussion of ways in which laws can be said to make sense, see
Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law (publication forthcoming in
1980). Professor Bice identifies five paradigms of irrationality: (1) actor does
not believe that his actions will further his goals; (2) actor believes that his ac-
tions will further his goals, but his belief is empirically implausible; (3) actor
believes that the goal of his action is in conflict with other goals he deems supe-
rior; (4) actor believes that he has not selected the most efficient means of
achieving his goals; and (5) actor believes that he has selected the most effi-
cient means of achieving his goals, but his belief is empirically implausible. Al-
though Professor Bice's paradigms seem to concern primarily means-ends,
instrumental rationality, this Article does not assume that all laws are intended
exclusively, or even largely, to express some form of instrumental rationality.
See text accompanying notes 152-172 infra.
3. See generally P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
153-54 (1961) (proposing scientific advisory panel to brief Supreme Court Jus-
tices on scientific and technological matters); O.W. HOLMES, Learning and Sci-
ence, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139, 140 (1920) ("An ideal system of law
should draw its postulates and its legislative justifications from science.").
4. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-based statutory
classification invalidated using intermediate scrutiny test). See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (measure that interfered with exercise of funda-
mental right to interstate travel invalidated, in part, because it failed to pro-
mote compelling state interest by least restrictive means).
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954) (statute
requiring racially segregated schools struck down because of realization that,
among other things, segregated schooling is psychologically harmful to black
children in grammar schools); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)
(statute permitting sterilization of habitual larcenists but not habitual embez-
zlers struck down in part on the ground that the differences between these two
types of criminals could not possibly demarcate relevant genetic categories);
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924) (classic case of changed
facts--"A Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when
the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared."). See gener-
ally Oteri & Silverglate, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Constitutional Dimensions of
the Marijuana Problem, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV. 55 (1968). Statutes or regulations of
this type that seem ripe for constitutional attack include those relating to sex-
ual conduct, pornography, the death penalty, illicit drugs, gender-based differ-
ences, constraints on marriage or reproduction, and insanity defenses. See, e.g.,
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (gender-based classification); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (pornography); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization); Durham
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This Article is concerned with a slightly different case: that of a
person who wishes to challenge a statute for its lack of rational-
ity, but who cannot make the requisite showing of irrationality
because the government controls the instrumentalities neces-
sary for generating the information essential to the challenge.
A successful constitutional challenge often requires that
the challenger make certain factual showings. A challenge may
therefore fail simply because of informational barriers erected
by the government. These barriers can take the form of out-
right bans or moratoria on certain kinds of research,6 or limita-
tions on access to certain substances needed for testing.7 The
government's blockage of access to necessary information may
be veiled or indirect, such as that resulting from its unex-
plained refusal to underwrite research that ordinarily would be
governmentally sponsored.8 In each of these situations, the
government's refusal to permit or to participate in the produc-
tion of essential information means that the constitutional chal-
lenge will fail regardless of its merit. Consequently, a bad law
may remain in force far beyond the time when it should have
been repealed or declared unconstitutional.
Two cases concerning illicit drug use illustrate this prob-
lem. In United States v. Ward,9 the defendant challenged a fed-
v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (insanity defense); Berg v. Clay-
ton, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (homo-
sexuality); Morrison v. Board of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969) (homosexuality); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964) (illicit drug use). See generally P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972); Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind:
Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") De-
fendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Apricot Power: Washington to Test Laetrile,
T IE, Oct. 9, 1978, at 104-05.
6. For a discussion of recent limitations and proposed curbs on race-
based intelligence research, genetic manipulation, and fetal research, see Del-
gado & Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection
for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 349-51 (1978).
7. For example, certain controlled substances, such as cocaine and LSD,
can be obtained only through federal dispensation. See The Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12 (1976) (establishing
schedules of controlled substances classified according to dangerousness and
medical value).
8. The government's refusal to fund certain kinds of scientific research
may implicate expression-related rights of researchers. See Delgado & Millen,
supra note 6, at 389, 396-97, 401. But see Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Re-
searc. A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208, 1267-79 (1978)
(right to research is subordinate to government's power to exercise budgetary
discretion). See generally G. CALAREsI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (when tech-
nology is within grasp in "tragic choice" situations, failure to proceed with its
development may be morally culpable).
9. 387 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1967).
1980]
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eral marijuana statute on rational basis grounds, arguing that
under the current state of scientific knowledge, marijuana was
improperly classified because it was placed in the same cate-
gory as far more dangerous drugs such as opium and heroin.
The government countered, arguing that existing studies ade-
quately demonstrated the dangerousness of marijuana. After
reviewing the evidence, Chief Judge Hastings of the Seventh
Circuit concluded that neither side had presented a persuasive
case; he therefore deferred to the judgment of Congress and
upheld the statute. Despite his ruling, Judge Hastings ex-
pressed misgivings over the strength of the state's case, and
called upon the government "to focus attention on the need for
definitive research" because the problem was one "requiring
the careful attention of the legislative branch."' 0
In United States v. Castro," a federal district court consid-
ered a similar challenge to a federal statute penalizing persons
for distributing cocaine. The defendant argued that cocaine is a
relatively harmless substance and that its sale did not warrant
the severe penalties called for by the statute. Both sides of-
fered scientific evidence concerning the drug, after which the
judge found that "from a medical viewpoint ... Congress has
erroneously classified cocaine with heroin and other opiates for
penalty purposes."' 2 The judge declined to declare the statute
unconstitutional, however, because he felt that other goals,
such as a desire to discourage euphoric states,13 might have
motivated Congress. Another factor that saved the statute from
unconstitutionality was its corrective clause, which empowered
the Attorney General to delete substances from the Act's cover-
age based on newly acquired information.14 The judge in Cas-
tro strongly recommended that the Attorney General
reconsider the classification of cocaine, since "[iit is clearly
preferable that the drug laws be based upon more substantial
factual evidence than the slender threads of minimum rational-
ity present here."' 5
More than ten years have passed since United States v.
Ward. If a court today, faced with a similar challenge, found
that the federal government had not yet carried out the re-
search urged by Judge Hastings, should that court continue to
10. Id. at 848.
11. 401 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
12. Id. at 124.
13. Id. at 125.
I 14. See id. at 127; 21 U.S.C. § 811 (1976).
15. 401 F. Supp. at 127.
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respect the presumption of the statute's constitutionality? Sim-
ilarly, if the Attorney General fails within a reasonable time to
reclassify cocaine, or at least to request the full-scale study
urged by the court in United States v. Castro, should a court
nevertheless sustain the antidistribution statute when it is next
challenged?'
6
This Article proposes that, as an aspect of ensuring that
laws are rational, courts must in appropriate cases17 assume
the function of protecting society's interest in what might be
called "active" or "developmental" rationality. 8 For the sake of
manageability the exposition of this novel rationality concept is
limited to penal statutes.19 In Part I, the Article examines the
nature of the duty courts may owe to criminal defendants fac-
ing prosecution under statutes like those challenged in Ward
and Castro; it reviews many aspects of our judicial system in
16. For a discussion of the slow rate of research into the physiological ef-
fects of illicit drug use, see Carr, Cocaine Today, HumAN BEHAVIOR, Mar. 1979,
at 4344; Greenberg, The Lore of Cocaine, SCIENCE NEWS, Sept. 9, 1978, at 187;
The Medical View, TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 26.
17. Many commentators feel that society's interest in rational statutes is
becoming more important as its dependence on technology increases. Profes-
sor Tribe has argued that changing conditions demand adjustments to our no-
tion of due process, and that our decisional structures must vary to promote
substantive constitutional ideals and human ends. See L. TIBE, supra note 1,
§§ 17-1 to -3, at 1137-46; Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
269 (1975).
18. The terms "active" and "developmental" rationality are used inter-
changeably throughout this Article. They are meant to designate the interest
that persons have in ensuring that legislation is kept current. The difference
between ordinary rationality and active rationality can be seen by comparing
two hypothetical statutes. Suppose that Statute A was enacted twenty years
ago, following extensive hearings. At the hearings, a "case" was made for the
factual basis on which the statute rests. Since then, no countervailing evidence
has appeared, nor has the government impeded research into the factual as-
sumptions underlying Statute A. In addition, no second-order evidence, see
note 24 infra, has been presented which suggests that Statute A could be made
to appear irrational if certain studies were carried out. Statute A is therefore
both ordinarily rational and actively rational.
Suppose further that Statute B was also enacted twenty years ago, follow-
ing extensive hearings at which its factual foundations were amply supported
by reputable studies. Immediately upon the close of the hearings, however, the
government ordered a moratorium on all research into the subject matter of
the factual assumptions underlying Statute B. Moreover, there is credible sec-
ond-order evidence that suggests that if the moratorium were lifted, the results
of additional research would conclusively demonstrate that Statute B is irra-
tional. In this case, Statute B would meet the requirements of ordinary ration-
ality, but not the requirements of active rationality.
19. The primary purpose of penal statutes is to regulate human behavior
through criminal sanction. This Article is concerned mainly with statutes
which deal with criminal conduct that is malum in se, rather than regulatory
statutes that deal with criminal conduct that is merely malum prohibitum. See
text accompanying notes 209-210 infra.
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order to demonstrate the system's preference for active or de-
velopmental rationality when litigation centers around adjudi-
cative rather than legislative facts. Also reviewed in this
section is the related issue of why courts rather than some
other institution should assume the duty of actively protecting
society from irrational criminal laws. In Part II, the Article con-
siders the elements of the prima facie case that, if shown,
should entitle one who challenges a criminal statute to relief,
and also discusses the various forms that such relief could
take. Part HI of the Article analyzes the arguments that can be
made against courts' following a policy of actively intervening
on behalf of defendants who are prosecuted under statutes that
have been effectively removed from rational basis review. The
Article concludes that since considerations of policy and insti-
tutional competence suggest that active or developmental ra-
tionality is an important and justiciable value, courts should
develop effective remedies for those defendants whose access
to judicial review might otherwise be denied.20
I.. RATIONALITY AS A PROTECTABLE VALUE: WHY
JUDICIAL SOLICITUDE?
A. THE PARADIGM
Imagine a case in which a person wishes to challenge the
validity of the criminal statute under which he is prosecuted,21
but cannot do so successfully because the state controls access
to the information needed to mount a credible challenge.2 2 The
20. Despite its use of two drug cases to illustrate the problem, see text ac-
companying notes 9-15 supra, this Article does not advocate that drugs be
decriminalized, nor does it advocate that any substantive area of the law be
changed. The Article also does not urge that courts utilize the active rationality
concept to revive the excesses of substantive due process. See note Ill infra
(reconsideration of rationality could lead to conclusion that penal statutes need
to be strengthened rather than repealed). Moreover, the author does not sub-
scribe to the view that courts may freely invent or find new fundamental inter-
ests lurking in every conceivable corner of the Constitution. Thus, while the
impact of adopting a standard of affirmative rationality would be significant and
highly beneficial, the author does not believe that the number of cases in which
it can be successfully invoked will be very great. Finally, this Article does not
propose that the government should be required to prove everything conclu-
sively before enacting a statute in a given area. Under the affirmative rational-
ity concept, the government would remain free, however, to pass legislation
based on doubt or reasonable guess; the government would not be free to pre-
vent subsequent efforts to show that doubt was not reasonable after all.
21. We therefore are not concerned with cases in which a prosecutorial
choice not to enforce an obsolete statute has been exercised.
22. The challenge might be made under the so-called "minimum rational-
ity" test that courts apply when no fundamental interest or suspect class is
[Vol. 64:467
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challenger is convinced that if governmentally imposed regula-
tory or funding barriers were lowered, new information would
be generated that would prove the statute irrational. To com-
plete our paradigm, assume that the challenged statute was ra-
tional when enacted, that is, that there existed sufficient
information in the form of reports and studies for it to with-
stand rational basis attack. Further assume that no new au-
thoritative information that would render the statute infirm has
since become available. If reviewed today, therefore, the stat-
ute would still meet the minimum rationality standard. By hy-
pothesis, however, our challenger can point to circumstances
tending to support his belief that further study would demon-
strate the statute's irrationality.23 In other words, he has relia-
ble second-order evidence24 that there is first-order evidence
available which would show that the statute is no longer ra-
tional.
If our challenger can convince the court that the legislature
should reexamine the rationality of its own statute when such
second-order evidence of irrationality exists, the court has sev-
eral alternatives open to it. First, it can simply ignore the infer-
ence raised by the second-order evidence and insist on
conclusive, first-order evidence before taking any action
designed to alter the status quo. This means that the statute
will remain in effect, perhaps indefinitely, since our defendant
does not have access to the precise factual information neces-
sary for striking down the statute. Second, the court can up-
hold the statute, but express its discontent to the legislature as
an admonition that reform of the statute is needed. Finally, the
present, or it might be made using equal protection, eighth amendment, or ir-
rebuttable presumption analyses. Each of these tests contains a rationality re-
quirement of one kind or another. See note 1 supra. Thus, the active
rationality concept must not be identified exclusively with the minimum ration-
ality test applied when courts review run-of-the-mill economic or other legisla-
tion that does not implicate a fundamental interest or suspect class.
23. This type of statute suffers from what could be called second-order
technolofcal desuetude, that is, irrationality that the defendant cannot prove
but feels ould be shown if the government were to permit the necessary inves-
tigation to go forward.
24. Second-order evidence is that which is not by itself sufficient to over-
turn a statute, but which suggests that further investigation may lead to conclu-
sive evidence that the statute is fatally irrational. Examples of second-order
evidence would include (1) small pilot studies conducted by reputable re-
searchers who have employed research techniques not available at the time the
stitute was enacted; (2) foreign studies which suggest that a statute is irra-
tional, but which require duplication by American scientists before acceptance;
(3) animal studies from which effects on humans can be generalized; and (4) a
showing that there was a significant methodological error in the studies upon
which a statute was originally based.
19801
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court can take some more significant action designed to over-
come the blockage of information. The remainder of this sec-
tion examines instances of judicial action that support this
third alternative.
B. CONSIDERATIONS DRAWN FROM THE JUDICIL PROCESS
The first consideration in favor of requiring active judicial
review of the rationality of certain criminal statutes is that ra-
tionality is a value that our legal system already actively pro-
tects in many other adjudicative contexts. Requiring courts to
protect this value actively when they review statutes would
therefore constitute simply an extension of current practice.25
1. Procedural and Evidentiary Trial Doctrines
Many of the procedural and evidentiary devices that courts
have developed to process information for trial evince a clear-
cut concern for the active protection of rationality. For in-
stance, the devices of discovery,26 compelled production of
documents 27 and witnesses, 28 cross-examination, 29 and most
forms of motion practice30 are aimed at making information
available to the litigants or to the trier of fact. Sanctions are
often provided for persons who without justification refuse to
cooperate with these fact-finding processes. 31 Voir dire,32 state-
appointed counsel,33 and state-provided transcripts for appeal34
are examples of costly measures that the state underwrites in
the hope that they will facilitate access to facts or arguments
that will lead to just results in legal dispute. Although there
are a few adjudicative rules such as evidentiary privileges that
impede the fact-finding function of courts, these rules do so
only to promote some other more pressing goal, such as en-
couraging public confidence in physicians. Courts therefore
25. Arguments more affirmative in character are considered in the next
section.
26. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
27. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 34, 37, 45.
28. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 45.
29. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). See generally F.
WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 27 (lst Collier ed. 1962).
30. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 50.
31. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 37 (sanctions for failure to cooperate in discov-
ery include finding contempt, levying fines, assessing attorney's fees and trial
expenses, striking claims or defenses, and dismissing actions).
32. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 47.
33. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
34. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
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tend to construe these privileges narrowly.35
One example of active judicial protection of rationality in
criminal trials is the rule that requires prosecutors to disclose
exculpatory evidence in their possession, at least when so re-
quested by the defense. 36 In this situation, society's desire for
accurate and truthful adjudication of criminal cases overrides
our legal system's customary preference for the adversarial
mode of adjudication.37 Some cases suggest that the prosecu-
tor's duty to disclose information extends even to evidence that
is not positively known to be exculpatory, but that may prove
to be so upon further development or investigation.3 8 This re-
quirement is tantamount to imposing a duty of developmental
rationality on the state, since it forces prosecutors to consider
the implications of second-order evidence that merely indicates
the existence of more probative first-order evidence. Courts
have applied a similar rule in cases in which a prosecutor has
information that there may be a suspect other than the person
on trial.39 The rule imposes a duty on the prosecutor to follow
up the lead until he is satisfied that the theory of an alternative
suspect is groundless. Failure to follow up the lead or at least
to disclose it to the defense may result in reversal on appeal.
40
In both these examples, it is no justification for inaction by the
prosecutor that he did not know the precise form that the po-
tentially exonerating evidence would take; the prosecutor can-
not avert his gaze from such evidence and attempt to obtain a
conviction based on a one-sided presentation of facts that he
knows may be misleading or untrue.
Another mechanism that illustrates the premium trial
35. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2195, 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
36. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); In re Kapatos, 208 F.
Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (duty arises in part because state has superior
fact-finding powers); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96
Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1971).
37. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d
525, 531, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1971). Cf. Engstrom v. Supe-
rior Ct., 20 Cal. App. 3d 240, 244, 97 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (1971) (prosecutor must
voluntarily disclose data that impeaches key prosecution witness). The Eng-
strom case provides inferential support for the proposition that in certain situa-
tions courts should impose an analogous obligation on the government to
cooperate with criminal defendants in "impeaching" the factual assumptions
underlying its own statutes.
38. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765-67 (3d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,
195 F.2d 815, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953); Griffin v.
United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
39. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor suppressed




courts place on developmental rationality is the set of eviden-
tiary rules that permit inferences to be drawn against parties
who decline to produce probative evidence when it is reason-
able under the circumstances to expect them to produce it.41 In
many jurisdictions, these rules also permit the trier of fact to
draw a negative inference if a party produces evidence that is
less probative than that which he might reasonably have been
expected to produce.42 Like the rules that require prosecutors
to develop or disclose certain information, this rule is an exam-
ple of shifting the burden of production simply on the basis of a
second-order showing that there appears to be more probative
evidence than that which has been produced. Because of the
close relationship between the rules governing judicial infer-
ence and the standards governing judicial review, 43 the nega-
tive inference cases suggest that it is not unrealistic for courts
to develop analogous doctrines for application to judicial review
of criminal laws."
41. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 272, at 656 (2d ed. 1972); J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW 507 (1895); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 285-91, at 162-88 (3d ed.
1940).
42. See, e.g., Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Perry, 326 F.2d 921, 925 (5th Cir. 1964);
Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675, 165 A.2d 598, 600 (1960);
Carr v. Amusement, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 368, 375-76, 177 N.W.2d 388, 392 (1970). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 272, at 656-57.
43. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-30, at 1084 n.23; Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 147-
48 (1893).
44. Because of the parallelism between procedures for judicial review and
trial mechanisms such as burdens of proof, inference rules, and presumptions,
some indication of the likelihood that courts reviewing the constitutionality of
criminal laws will accept the active rationality concept can be gained by exam-
ining the policies underlying the rules relating to presumptions and burdens of
proof. Professor Cleary identifies three elements that influence the rules for al-
locating pleading burdens: policy, probability, and fairness. See Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5,
11 (1959). Applying these elements to our paradigm, it appears that each factor
favors the active rationality concept. There are powerful policy reasons for ac-
tively protecting rationality, principally that a sense of legitimacy should per-
vade governmental acts and laws. See text accompanying notes 104-111 infra.
Considerations of probable outcome also support active rationality. The sec-
ond-order evidence amassed by the challenger decreases the probability that
the compelled investigation will be fruitless, and increases the chance that a
beneficial change in legislation may result. The factor of fairness also militates
in favor of imposing a duty of active rationality on the state. The research nec-
essary to prove the irrationality of a statute will often be expensive and beyond
the capacity of any individual defendant to carry out. See text accompanying
note 8 supra. The convenience factor is, of course, most persuasive when the
government has monopoly power over inquiry in an area, so that no private
person can perform the studies necessary for effectively challenging a statute.
These factors suggest that if a challenger's task were to prove adjudicative
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A third indication of the affirmative manner in which
courts protect rationality is the traditional practice of opinion
writing. 45 It is certainly possible that judges could simply an-
nounce their decisions without written comment. That would
not be satisfactory, however, because a simple fiat such as
"plaintiff wins" or "the statute is unconstitutional" would dis-
courage reasoned analyses of factual settings, and would im-
pede the dialectical search for a consistent body of law.4 6 The
practice of avoiding inconsistent decisions by wryting opin-
ions4 7 is thus another example of active judicial solicitude for
rationality.
State-provided counsel and transcripts for appeal, court-ap-
pointed expert witnesses, compelled production of documents
and witnesses, and the practice of opinion writing are all costly
in the financial sense. The rules of discovery, the mandatory
policy of disclosing exculpatory evidence, and the doctrines of
negative inference entail other kinds of costs that tax the ad-
versarial nature of our legal system. Society accepts these
costs because it believes that the litigant's and fact-finder's in-
terests in access to critical adjudicative facts justify incurring
them. The ability to command legislative facts, 48 however, may
be equally critical to a defendant's case. It certainly is illogical
to place such a high value on assisting defendants in obtaining
helpful adjudicative facts, while at the same time denying them
any assistance in obtaining necessary legislative facts when
their defense may rest on overcoming a presumption of statu-
tory rationality. Aside from being illogical, this unwillingness
to help defendants ascertain legislative facts allocates re-
facts, he would probably be aided by a presumption or some other burden-
shifting device that would make his task easier. It seems equally reasonable
that similar aids might be employed by courts which must rely on constitu-
tional and legislative facts when reviewing the rationality of a criminal statute.
Devices such as burden-shifting and legislative remands could be utilized to
protect interests that are essentially identical to those that are at stake when
adjudicative facts are implicated. See text accompanying notes 142-151 infra.
45. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1957).
46. See id. at 5; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 15, 19 (1959) (courts should not decide on ad hoc or
result-oriented bases, but should reach decisions based on articulable princi-
ples and give reasons for their holdings).
47. The rationality interest protected by the practice of opinion writing is
one concerned mainly with internal consistency, rather than correspondence
with external reality. Nevertheless, it is a developmental rationality interest in
that it permits, indeed encourages, changes over time that take account of
changed conditions in society.
48. For a discussion of the concept of legislative facts, see 2 K. DAVIs, AD-
mIISTRATmVE LAW TREATisE § 15.04 (lst ed. 1958).
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sources in questionable fashion. A single expenditure on be-
half of a defendant mounting a constitutional challenge could
result in the reform or abolition of an obsolete law, thereby
benefiting all of society. Expenditures mandated by procedural
and evidentiary doctrines, by contrast, are recurring rather
than single costs, and result only in individualized benefits.
Committing the state to a single outlay for ascertaining
whether the factual assumptions underlying a widely applied
criminal statute reinain valid makes at least as good sense as
committing it to a recurring outlay for ensuring the fair applica-
tion of that statute.49
2. Substantive Trial Doctrines
The expense and trouble that society willingly assumes in
order to assure defendants procedural fairness suggest that the
assurance of substantive legislative fairness should receive
similar affirmative protection. There are, in fact, areas of law in
which courts alter substantive duties of the government after
second-order evidence tending to show the existence of rele-
vant first-order evidence has been presented. Action that
would otherwise be impermissible is thereby allowed. The is-
suance of a search warrant, for example, partially invalidates a
police officer's duty to refrain from entering private premises
against the will of the occupants. When an officer enters prem-
ises against the will of its occupants, the entry is legal only if
the officer has first obtained a search warrant by making a
prima facie showing, before a judge or magistrate, that certain
evidence is likely to be found on the premises.0 The officer
need not convince the judge that the evidence sought will in-
culpate the suspect, nor must the officer describe the evidence
with specificity.5 ' A successful showing might consist of noth-
ing more than the tip of an informant who is known from past
experience to be reliable.52 The reliability of this type of sec-
ond-order showing is sufficient to alter the nature of the gov-
49. See generally text accompanying notes 98-103 infra (single outlay re-
quired by affirmative rationality also makes sense since it serves informational
needs of courts).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (government agent must show probable
cause in order to obtain search warrant). See generally Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
51. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504 (1925) (particularity re-
quirement for search warrant is satisfied if officer gives general description of
the type of contraband sought).
52. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); McCray v. Illi-
nois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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ernment's duty to respect its citizens' interests in privacy.
Thus, even if no first-order evidence were ultimately found, this
fact would not affect the legality of the search.
In most other situations, the reverse of the search warrant
example occurs. Upon a second-order showing that a defend-
ant neglected to investigate the possible existence of important
first-order evidence, a court will often punish him for action
that would otherwise be permissible. In other words, courts
recognize that certain showings of second-order evidence are
sufficient to mature previously inchoate duties. For example,
certain tort cases hold that when an individual or agency is put
on notice of a possible hazard, a duty to inquire may arise.
53
Thus, a proprietor of premises open to the public or a munici-
pality responsible for maintaining a roadway may, after learn-
ing of one or two accidents, be under a duty to carry out or
fund a study to determine whether their facilities are in fact
dangerous. Evidence that such accidents have occurred is not
necessarily sufficient to establish negligent operation by the
proprietor. But since notice of such accidents is second-order
evidence of the possible existence of a hazard, such a showing
often induces courts to impose on proprietors a duty to inquire
into the existence of more probative first-order evidence. The
proprietors in cases like these are therefore not under a duty to
repair or redesign their facilities; this duty would arise only
upon a showing of first-order evidence clearly indicating the
existence of a hazard. The second-order showing that the pro-
prietors had notice of a probable hazard has simply imposed on
them a duty to search for first-order evidence that would posi-
tively indicate the existence or nonexistence of a hazard.
Courts have imposed a similar obligation to inquire on phy-
sicians and other persons charged with special responsibili-
ties.5 4 Physicians are often visited by patients who show some
but not all symptoms of a certain disease or condition.55 On
53. See, e.g., Gas Serv. Co. v. Payton, 180 F.2d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 1950);
Le Blanc v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 5 So. 2d 204, 206 (La. App. 1941);
Moore v. Kenockee Township, 75 Mich. 332, 341, 42 N.W. 944, 947 (1889). Cf.
Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 252-54, 180 N.W.2d 788, 789-91 (1970) (develop-
ment of simple, inexpensive medical test for phenylketonuria imposes a duty
on physicians to use the test on newborn children; "can implies ought"). See
also Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68, 72 (La. App. 1942) (general duty to investi-
gate exists once defendant placed on "inquiry notice").
54. See, e.g., Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
55. In Gates, the patient showed certain symptoms of glaucoma, a disa-
bling eye disease, the effects of which become more pronounced with time.
The symptoms found put the patient in a "borderline glaucoma area." Id. at
248, 595 P.2d at 921.
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the basis of such incomplete evidence, a physician may feel
that there is no reason for treating the patient as though he ac-
tually has the disease or condition, since the treatment may be
expensive, painful, or risky. On these facts, a patient could not
prevail in a malpractice suit against a physician for negligent
failure to treat. Notice of the patient's symptoms, however,
may impose on the physician a duty to perform additional diag-
nostic tests.56 Failure to carry out such tests-to pursue first-
order medical evidence-may cause a court to find against a
physician for negligent failure to inquire.5 7
Certain substantive criminal doctrines also indicate a judi-
cial preference for rules that encourage rather than hinder the
development of essential factual information. In the "willful
blindness" cases,5 8 courts have in effect imposed a duty to
search for additional facts upon actors who have been exposed
to certain second-order evidence. For instance, the prosecutor
in United States v. Jewel159 relied on the willful blindness con-
cept to obtain the conviction of a defendant who had brought
marijuana into the United States in a secret compartment of
his car. The defendant disclaimed knowledge of both the com-
partment and its contents. The Ninth Circuit approved the trial
judge's instruction to the jury concerning implied knowledge,
citing Glanville Williams' treatise on criminal law60 for the
proposition that "willful blindness is equivalent to
knowledge."61 Thus, if a party has his "suspicions aroused"
that actual evidence of criminal conduct may exist 62 and never-
theless refuses to make further inquiries, the law may deem
56. The court in Gates indicated its awareness that diagnostic tests for
glaucoma are safe and inexpensive, although somewhat uncomfortable. Id.
57. See, e.g., id. at 248-49, 595 P.2d at 923-24.
58. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United
States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935
(1978); United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v.
Brawner, 482 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974).
59. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
60. G. WaiLAMs, CRImINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 159 (2d ed.
1961).
61. 532 F.2d at 700 n.7.
62. In Jewell, the prosecution was unable to prove that the defendant had
positive knowledge that he was carrying illegal cargo. The court did find, how-
ever, that there was evidence indicating that the defendant knew of the secret
compartment in his trunk, and that he had knowledge of facts indicating that
the compartment might contain marijuana. Id. at 699. It was the defendant's
deliberate attempt to remain ignorant of the compartment's contents that led
the court to attribute such knowledge to him. See id. at 702-04.
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him to have knowledge of that evidence.63
These tort and criminal doctrines demonstrate that when
knowledge of certain facts establishes culpability, the deliber-
ate refusal to acquire such knowledge, despite second-order ev-
idence of its existence, may itself be culpable. Thus, when
second-order evidence suggests to lawmakers that further in-
quiry should be made into a statute's continuing viability, their
failure to so inquire might also be considered culpable. Recent
examples of institutional litigation demonstrate that when im-
portant interests are at stake, the government is not necessar-
ily exempt from sanctions normally imposed only on private
litigants. 64 Under the facts of our paradigm, courts could apply
such sanctions if the defendant showed that the government
had violated an important obligation: the duty to inquire into
the rationality of a law when existing second-order evidence in-
dicates probable existence of first-order evidence that would
prove the law irrational.65
63. It is worth observing that the willful blindness cases may stand for a
narrow proposition of law. In Jewell, the appellate court let stand the following
jury instruction delivered by the trial judge: "[T]he government must prove,
'beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was not actually aware...
his ignorance in that regard was solely and entirely a result of... a conscious
purpose to avoid learning the truth."' Id. at 704 (emphasis supplied by court).
The appellate court suggested, however, that the jury should have been in-
structed directly (1) that the required knowledge is established if the accused
is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question, (2) unless
he actually believes it does not exist. Id. at 704 n.21. This gloss on the trial
judge's instruction more closely addresses the potential application of the will-
ful blindness theory to our paradigm.
64. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on
standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp.
373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aft'd in part, remanded in part, decision
reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (ED. Ark. 1970), affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971);
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (ED. Ark. 1969); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17
Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). See generally Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1979).
65. A person challenging the rationality of a criminal law would probably
be required to show that enforcement of the government's duty to reexamine
critical legislative facts is as essential as requiring that school districts be inte-
grated, see, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1976); that jalls and prisons not be filthy or overcrowded, see, e.g.,
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); and that mental institutions offer mini-
mally humane care. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.),
hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344
F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid in par remanded in part,
decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.




Although not couched in terms of culpability or duty, the
role of post-trial motions further supports the notion that
courts recognize an affirmative obligation to generate certain
types of information to avoid irrationality. For example, mo-
tions for new trial66 or for judgment n.o.v. 67 require courts to
decide whether a reasonable jury could have found for the pre-
vailing party on the facts as presented. 68 In ruling on such mo-
tions, the judge cannot substitute his judgment for the jury's.69
It is not the object of these motions to permit courts to replace
one notion of rationality with another; rather, their object is to
ensure that utterly irrational verdicts, ones without support in
the evidence, do not remain in effect.7 0 Thus, courts will not set
aside a judgment if it appears that the jury heard the evidence,
weighed it, and came to its decision based on a rational applica-
tion of the evidence to the governing laws.7 1 But if there is evi-
dence that the jury decided on the basis of prejudice or
extraneous information,7 2 or that it did not weigh the facts at
all,73 the court will set aside the verdict. In effect, the court
tells the parties that the fact-finding process must be repeated
since it did not work correctly the first time. The use of these
post-trial motions shows that courts actively protect rationality
in adjudicative settings even when doing so requires breaching
the barrier that separates courts from other participants in the
legal process. If in flagrant cases of irresponsibility courts will
command that the jury's work be redone, it does not seem un-
thinkable that they might require the same for the work of leg-
berg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1980).
66. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
67. E.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 50.
68. These motions, of course, do not seek the same end, nor are the stan-
dards applied to them the same. See generally C. WmGrr, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 95, at 467 (3d ed. 1976). What the two motions do
have in common is that they permit the trial judge to correct a verdict when he
feels that the proceeding has been badly tainted with error. See id.
69. See, e.g., Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
70. See id. at 652-53.
71. See id. at 653.
72. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (attack on verdict may be made when it ap-
pears that "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention").
73. See, e.g., Hukde v. Kimble, 172 Kan. 630, 243 P.2d 225 (1952) (quotient
verdict). See generally J. CoUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, CASES AND MATERIALs 886-91 (2d ed. 1974) (improper jury conduct in-




islatures. Legislative facts are treated somewhat more
deferentially than adjudicative facts,7 4 but they are never per-
mitted to remain completely beyond judicial cognizance.
Other instances in which courts have actively protected ra-
tionality can be found in the final stages of criminal adjudica-
tion. For example, eighth amendment and due process
doctrines governing discretion in sentencing impose obligations
to respect instrumental rationality: the punishment meted out
must promote agreed-upon penal objectives and must be pro-
portional to the gravity of the offense 7 5 Even the requirement
that in criminal proceedings the state must prove its case be-
yond a reasonable doubt6 is an aspect of active rationality. By
allocating the risk of error to the state, this requirement reflects
our belief that the outcome to be particularly avoided is the
conviction of an innocent person
77
4. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
Another example of courts actively seeking to ensure ra-
tionality is their treatment of problems of statutory interpreta-
tion. Courts are often confronted with cases in which the
"plain meaning" of a statute is uncertain. In these cases, they
generally look to legislative purpose to discern the meaning of
the statute.7 8 Assuming that the statute in question does in
fact have an instrumental purpose, the court decides the case
by attempting to ascertain what it was the legislature intended
74. See generally Thayer, supra note 43.
75. See note 1 supra. This instrumental rationality requirement is typi-
cally met by having the government carry out investigations and prepare
presentence reports designed to gather information about the defendant. See,
e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 4-5 (approved
draft, 1968). Individual consideration of each defendant is constitutionally man-
dated in dealth penalty cases. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976).
76. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court observed:
There is always in litigation a margin of error .... Where one party
has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant
his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of
proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the con-
clusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 525-26.
77. See id. at 529; Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death. Evolving Standards
for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L REV. 989, 1019-20
(1978) (risk-of-error analysis explains differing intensities of judicial review).
78. See generally Bice, supra note 2.
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to accomplish by enacting the statute.79
For example, suppose that a state legislature has decreed
that "parades and processions" shall be prohibited in public
parks unless authorized by the park service. A group of jogging
enthusiasts organizes a series of cross-country races across
public parkland, and a conservationist group sues to enjoin the
park department from permitting the races. In order to decide
whether a cross-country foot race is a "parade or procession,"
the court ascertains the goals of the statute and determines
whether these goals would be furthered by regulating foot
races in public parks. If the court finds that the legislature or-
dered the prohibition to preserve the serenity and privacy of
public parks, it enjoins the races. If, however, the court finds
that the objective of the decree was to eliminate the pollution
of and strain on park facilities caused by cars, trucks, floats and
other parade equipment, the court permits the foot races to
proceed. This type of inquiry requires that the court surmise
how the legislature would have resolved the problem. To jus-
tify this type of action, the court necessarily assumes that the
legislation expresses rational objectives, that the legislature
desires that new cases be resolved in accordance with these
objectives, and that it is legitimate for the court to discern leg-
islative goals and see that they are furthered in the current sit-
uation.
This approach to statutory interpretation protects values
that are very similar to the active or developmental rationality
concept advanced in this Article. Active rationality assumes
that legislation is designed to serve identifiable goals, that such
goals should be construed dynamically so that statutes remain
viable in the face of new or changing circumstances, and that
courts have an appropriate role in assuring the validity of these
assumptions. There is, to be sure, one significant difference be-
tween active rationality and its statutory interpretation ana-
logue. When construing a statute in a new context, the court
accepts the statute's original core of rationality, and simply ap-
plies that core to the facts before it. Under the active rational-
ity concept, however, the court concedes the statute's initial
rationality, but questions whether its rationality would be un-
dermined if certain additional evidence, the probable existence
of which has been demonstrated, were available to the court.
Nevertheless, both these modes of judicial action seek to en-
79. See id.; see also United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1959);
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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sure that laws operate rationally, that they promote their own
purposes, and that they make sense. If, in the process of inter-
pretation, courts subject statutes to robust and sometimes im-
aginative treatment to ensure their continuing correspondence
with constantly changing realities, it is not unreasonable to im-
agine courts taking equally decisive action when they are frus-
trated in ascertaining whether certain realities even exist.
5. Judicial Review
Mention was made earlier of the various kinds of rational-
ity tests courts employ when reviewing legislative enact-
ments.80 A further argument in favor of active judicial
protection of rationality in situations like our paradigm, then, is
that rationality is a value which courts traditionally protect
when reviewing statutes. If lack of rationality is such a
nonvalue that upon finding it courts will nullify measures en-
acted by a separate branch of government on this ground, then
it seems reasonable that courts would likewise view active or
developmental rationality as a value worth preserving in cer-
tain cases.81 One indication that courts view active or develop-
mental rationality as a protectable interest is their treatment of
certain disfavored grounds of decision. Some reviewing courts
have refused to consider certain justifications that, although
originally advanced by the state in defense of a statute, are no
longer put forward because the state finds them anachronistic,
embarrassing, or politically untenable.82 If courts are willing to
rule out obsolete or lame facts that nevertheless provide colora-
ble support for an outmoded statute, it seems but a small step
80. See note 1 supra.
81. This result, of course, does not follow in strict logic. Courts may with
logical consistency take the position that they should strike down only that leg-
islation which, on the record, appears irremediably irrational, and refuse to par-
ticipate in the process by which the evidence of irrationality in statutes is
developed. Indeed, it appears that modern courts have lapsed into this passive
mode of protecting rationality for fear of resurrecting the excesses of Lochner-
era substantive due process. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32
(1963).
82. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (reasons ad-
vanced in justification of a gender-based classification rejected as "'archaic and
overbroad' generalizations" about women); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443
(1972) (Court refused to consider obvious possible justifications for birth con-
trol prohibition). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9
(1974) (Court mentioned that the original purposes for barring pregnant school
teachers from teaching included a desire to prevent young children from seeing
pregnant women, "to illustrate the possible role of outmoded taboos in the




to have courts ensure that under certain circumstances the gov-
ernment considers whether the grounds it once advocated for a
statute have in fact become lame.8 3 Indeed, this latter function
could probably be carried out with even less loss of institu-
tional goodwill than the former. Telling a coordinate branch of
government that its work product, although once sound, is now
in need of reconsideration is apt to be more favorably received
than overturning its work product as being unworthy of sal-
vage.
Another indication of reviewing courts' concern for devel-
opmental rationality is supplied by cases such as Ward84 and
Castro,85 in which the courts apparently believe that the state
is shirking a duty. In these cases, judges occasionally issue re-
quests or warnings that bring to mind the increasingly sharply
worded admonitions that federal courts have issued in cases of
institutional litigation before taking more decisive action.
86
83. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-30, at 1085.
84. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
86. Before seizing control of school districts, jail systems, or mental insti-
tutions, courts have usually first communicated their displeasure with the
shocking conditions found in these institutions. When it becomes apparent
that the agency in charge of such an institution, despite the court's warnings,
will not repair the situation, courts have taken charge by appointing receivers
or issuing detailed orders. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala.), hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), en-
forced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afOd in par re-
manded in part decision reversed in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The plaintiffs in Wyatt, a group of inmates at an Alabama
mental institution, complained of wretched living conditions and inadequate
treatment. An initial hearing determined that the state was in violation of its
duty to provide minimally adequate care. The plaintiffs therefore requested
that the court adopt procedures for determining what would constitute ade-
quate standards of mental treatment at the facility. See 325 F. Supp. at 785.
The court, however, declined to rule on this request until the state of Alabama
had been given an adequate opportunity to consider and promulgate such stan-
dards. The court gave Alabama six months to produce standards of treatment,
and indicated that if the state failed to do so, the court would appoint a panel of
experts to carry out a study. Nine months later, the court found that the ex-
isting treatment program at the institution was still completely inadequate, see
334 F. Supp. at 1344 n.3, and scheduled a hearing for the parties to propose new
standards. At this hearing, an even more sordid tale of institutional neglect
was told, and the court immediately issued an interim emergency order aimed
at remedying the most appalling conditions, see id. at 373; one month later, a
second, more detailed order was issued, see id. at 387. The Fifth Circuit re-
cently affirmed the substance of Judge Johnson's earlier orders. See 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). For a vivid account of this running battle, see Eisenberg &
Yeazell, supra note 65, at 468-70.
Where enforcement of a statutory scheme is expressly committed to a state
or federal administrative agency, courts have felt even less hesitation at pres-
suring the agency through remands, orders to reconsider, and writs of manda-
mus to carry out studies or to investigate further some matter related to the
[Vol. 64:467
ACTIVE RATIONALITY
And, where no suitable target for such a warning is readily
available, courts have often tried to supplement the record
before them by carrying out empirical or library research, by
exhorting counsel to brief certain matters, or by appointing
special masters to gather information.87 Courts that take such
agency's jurisdiction. Many of these skirmishes have concerned environmental
protection. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). An impor-
tant case for conservationists battling government agencies is Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978). In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court implicitly approved a reviewing
court's power, under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
61 (1976), to order an administrative investigation reopened upon submission to
the administrative agency of second-order evidence that was "sufficient to re-
quire reasonable minds to inquire further." 435 U.S. at 554. The Court cau-
tioned, however, that "cryptic and obscure references to matters that 'ought to
be'" do not constitute such sufficient second-order evidence. Id. This was a re-
sponse to the consumer group's contention that the agency should have investi-
gated the alternative of energy conservation before licensing the nuclear power
plant. Vermont Yankee therefore establishes certain upper limits on the power
of reviewing courts to question the rationality of administrative agency deci-
sionmaking.
In the environmental law field, a court's power to compel an agency to up-
date its conduct or guidelines to conform with technological advances is often
aided by statutes containing "technology-forcing" provisions. Of these statutes,
the best known are the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61
(1976); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7642 (Supp. 1 1977); and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). See, e.g., Union Elec.
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 593 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1979) (technol-
ogy-forcing application of Clean Air Act).
87. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Justices concurring
and dissenting with per curiam decision used statistics from various studies in
arguments on constitutionality of death penalty); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (Court in landmark school desegregation case cited nu-
merous social science studies, some apparently not briefed by counsel); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (for consideration of constitutionality of stat-
ute limiting hours of employment for women, Court took 'Judicial cognizance
of all matters of general knowledge"); United States v. Castro, 401 F. Supp. 120
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (judge apparently carried out research on classification of co-
caine as a narcotic); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69 (1964) (in upholding use of peyote by Native American Church for religious
purposes, court relied on studies apparently uncovered during original re-
search). See also Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 547 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (judges increasingly doing research beyond record
when they must decide policy issues); Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin,
293 U.S. 194, 213 (1934) (Court remanded case to trial court with instructions to
develop needed legislative facts); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548
(1924) ("Court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for
laying down a rule of law."); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227
(1908) (Holmes, J.) (judges must discover facts needed to establish laws). See
generally P. FREt ND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 50-51 (1949) (cit-
ing Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
for proposition that the "Brandeis Brief' was motivated by a "sense of the con-
trolling vitality of facts"); Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance
and Procedure, 33 U. Mi~m L. REv. 21, 30, 32, 37 (1978) (courts go beyond rec-
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action give unmistakable evidence of their concern for develop-
mental rationality, since the course of least resistance would be
simply to leave the record as they received it.
The "irrebuttable presumption" cases 88 are yet another ex-
ample of the manner in which reviewing courts protect devel-
opmental rationality in the public law domain. As seen by
some commentators, the common thread in these cases is the
judiciary's insistence that, in zones of fluid attitudinal change,
the state provide individualized treatment rather than rely on
uniform rules applicable to all. 89 The underlying notion is that
strict application of rules in such zones impairs development of
the factual knowledge and moral insights necessary for forming
new social consensuses.90 In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,9 1 for example, the Supreme Court was faced with a
school board regulation that required pregnant school teachers
to take unpaid maternity leave at the onset of their fifth month
of pregnancy. The regulation created an irrebuttable presump-
tion that pregnant school teachers become physically unfit to
teach upon reaching this point in their pregnancy.92 The Court
held that a blanket rule compelling all pregnant school teachers
to take leave, without permitting them to present evidence con-
cerning their health and ability to teach, violated due process. 9
3
ord to ascertain needed facts); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 546, 550 (1974) (approves of fed-
eral courts using special masters or requesting counsel to supplement record in
order to ensure factual integrity in complex environmental decisions).
88. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
89. See generally Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note 17, at 305-07.
90. See id. at 306-07. There is a persuasive argument that the irrebuttable
presumption cases can be viewed as judicially enforced experiments. See id.
Under this view, the Court's decisions stem from its members' concern that the
debate over society's treatment of pregnant school teachers, see notes 91-92 in-
fra and accompanying text, and unmarried fathers, see note 93 infra, might be
advanced by the presence of an able pregnant school teacher or a nurturing un-
married father, since such examples would tend to weaken certain ingrained
concepts of gender-based abilities and limitations. See Tribe, Structural Due
Process, supra note 17, at 305-06.
91. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
92. Id. at 644. The Court noted, however, that the regulation may originally
have been intended not as a measure for removing physically incapacitated
teachers from the classroom, but as a method of insulating school children
from the sight of conspicuously pregnant women. Id. at 641 n.9. The school
board did not contend that this consideration could serve as a legitimate basis
for the rule, however, and the Court noted it simply to demonstrate how "out-
moded taboos" may sometimes form the actual basis of unchallengeable rules.
Id. See also note 82 supra and accompanying text.
93. 414 U.S. at 650. Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the
Court held that a law making the children of unmarried fathers wards of the
state upon the death of the mother, without permitting the fathers to present
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In effect, the irrebuttable presumption cases hold that
when the state attempts to impose a deprivation that impli-
cates an important liberty or that significantly burdens some
"sensitive" class of persons, 94 it is fundamentally unfair for the
state to restrict the scope of the evidence that may be
presented at a hearing on the propriety of that deprivation.
This, of course, is simply an analogue of judicial action
designed to supplement the record;95 it is judicial action
designed to prevent the government from unreasonably abridg-
ing the record that will eventually reach a reviewing court. The
unfairness of the government's action is not overridden by the
consideration that it may be rational for the state to restrict the
record for reasons of administrative convenience. Returning
for the moment to our paradigm situation,96 it is clear that our
hypothetical defendant is faced with the deprivation of an im-
portant liberty-he will be incarcerated if his constitutional
challenge fails-and also that he is a member of a special
class-persons formally accused but not yet convicted of
crimes.97 Surely it would be unthinkable for the government,
in the name of administrative convenience, to prevent defend-
ants from presenting any evidence at all at their hearings or tri-
als. But this is precisely what occurs, albeit indirectly, when
the government deprives defendants of the ability to command
the legislative facts they need to prove a statute's irrationality.
6. Summary: The Informational Needs of Courts
The major consideration in favor of actively protecting ra-
tionality in situations like that of our paradigm is simply that
courts already actively protect rationality in almost every other
area-procedural as well as substantive-of our judicial system.
evidence of their ability to raise their children, violated due process. Id. at 657-
58.
94. See L TRmE, supra note 1, § 16-32, at 1095 ("Court has applied the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine only in situations where intermediate or strict
scrutiny was independently warranted either by the involvement of a sensitive
classification or by the presence of an important liberty") (emphasis added).
95. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
96. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
97. The recent case of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), is an example of
the Court devising, on behalf of pretrial detainees, a special substantive test to
determine what types of action by jailers amount to unconstitutional punish-
ment. See id. at 584-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Standards
of Judicial Review for Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 63 Mmn. L. REv. 457
(1979). Arguably, the Wolfish decision represents the implicit concern of the
Court that persons formally accused of crimes, because they may be the sub-
ject of unwarranted animus, comprise at least a sensitive, even if not a suspect
class. See note 94 supra.
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This protection of rationality is apparent in the trial functions
of courts, as well as in the exercise of their powers of statutory
construction and judicial review. This suggests that courts
faced with the choice of whether or not to protect active ration-
ality in situations resembling our paradigm will find a wealth of
guidance in other areas that points toward protecting this
value.
The argument to this point has proceeded largely by induc-
tion: since courts actively protect rationality in many similar
situations, it is certainly plausible for them to do so in our para-
digm situation as well. Implicit in this proposal, however, is an-
other argument that proceeds along far more positive lines:
that it is in the self-interest of courts to protect rationality ac-
tively in our paradigm situation since such action would be a
means for courts to satisfy their own legitimate informational
needs. This argument leads to the conclusion that judicial ac-
tion in this respect is not only plausible, but desirable from the
viewpoint of courts.
As observed earlier, courts need certain facts in order to
function properly.9 8 If neither the court nor the party inter-
ested in proving some fact is able to carry out this function be-
cause the necessary legislative facts are being kept hidden by
the action or inaction of another branch of government, the re-
viewing court must labor under a significant handicap. If the
court has good reason, in the form of second-order evidence, 99
to believe that further inquiry would yield the needed informa-
tion, it would not be surprising if the court attempts to remove
its handicap00 by ordering or at least encouraging remedial ac-
98. This factual showing will always be relevant to the court's final deter-
mination, and in many cases it will be determinative. See Bikl, Judicial Deter-
mination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of
Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REv. 6, 19 (1924) ("the necessity for . . . in-
dependent consideration [of facts] by the courts exists, whatever be the degree
of deference which the courts will pay to the legislative finding"). See also
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923)
("It is manifest ... that the mere declaration by a legislature that a business is
affected with a public interest is not conclusive .... The circumstances...
are always a subject of judicial inquiry."). See generally C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE
AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REvIEw IN A DEMOCRACY (1960) (power to strike
down acts of the legislature is essential for "validation" function of courts in
our political system).
99. The concept of second-order evidence is discussed in note 24 supra.
100. This result may be more likely to occur in state courts, since there is
some indication that, in due process cases, state courts have applied the ra-
tional basis standard more vigorously than federal courts. See, e.g., State v. A.J.
Bayless Mkts., Inc., 86 Ariz. 193, 342 P.2d 1088 (1959); Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965); State v. Park, 42
[Vol. 64:467
ACTIVE RATIONALITY
tion designed to generate these facts. 101
Consider the analogy that can be drawn from a hypotheti-
cal card game between two players, presided over by a referee
or judge. The game is thrown into chaos when the lettering on
the playing cards suddenly fades and disappears. Player A
submits evidence to the referee tending to show that player B
introduced a trick deck whose markings become invisible when
the cards are exposed to a small magnet that a player can eas-
ily conceal in his sleeve. Player B then demands to be declared
the game's winner since he was ahead at the time the trick was
played. What are the equities in favor of player A? Although
he probably would have lost anyway, he still has a right to play
the game out according to the rules. Perhaps he might even
save a victory. In this situation, it is likely that the referee
would refuse to declare player B the winner and would require
instead that a new deck be introduced and the hand replayed.
This example suggests that litigants who are unable to
challenge a penal statute successfully because their govern-
mental opponent has interfered with the development of neces-
sary information may find themselves assisted by judges
asserting their own interests in fair adjudication.102 Just as the
referee in our card game would insist on a replaying of the
hand so that he can fairly judge the outcome, judges in cases
like that of our paradigm may take similar actions to ensure
that the government refrains from interfering with the judging
function. It has already been demonstrated that courts do not
hesitate to penalize parties who refuse to cooperate with the
adjudicative fact-finding function of the judiciary.103 This Arti-
Nev. 386, 178 P. 389 (1919); Gundaker Cent. Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71,
127 A.2d 566 (1956), appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
101. A court's willingness to take such remedial action would probably cor-
respond roughly to the intensity of the level of review employed by the court.
The various levels of judicial review, see note 1 supra, reflect the judiciary's
concern over the propriety of reviewing certain matters; that is, some matters
are more clearly the court's business than others. The least stringent level is
the "minimum rationality" test, which courts apply when reviewing legislation
that does not implicate a fundamental interest or burden a suspect class or one
of the sensitive categories, such as gender. Even when reviewing this kind of
economics-based legislation, however, a court might justifiably become impa-
tient when government-erected informational barriers affect the court's ability
to carry out even a cursory review of the subject. Seen in this light, rationality
review reflects judicial acquiescence with respect to certain matters, but does
not rule out judicial activity when courts are faced with unreasonable impedi-
ments to the very exercise of this already minimized function.
102. See sources cited in note 98 supra. See generally R. WASSERSTROM,
THE JuDiciAL DECISION 92-97 (1961); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 75; see also Gunther, supra note 1, at 18-22.
103. See notes 31, 42, 86 supra and accompanying text.
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cle simply proposes that courts should take a comparably dim
view of adversaries who impede the court's ability to ascertain
legislative facts.
The proposal may seem novel because issues of develop-
mental rationality have only recently begun to arise in connec-
tion with legislative facts. Constitutional and legislative facts
are not often challenged, and when they are the court's atten-
tion tends to be drawn to other issues such as the nature of the
interest asserted and the appropriate standard of review. But
what if any level of judicial review is rendered impossible be-
cause of an information blockage brought about by one of the
parties? Regardless of the interests of the injured litigant, then,
courts in this situation might well find a basis for remedial ac-
tion in their own institutional need for adequate information.
C. THEORETICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: PROTECTING
LEGITIMACY AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS
1. Legitimacy
Legitimacy-the assurance that a citizen feels when he
knows that laws are "fair-is essential to a government that
rules by consent of the governed. 0 4 Without it, the stability of
a political system is constantly threatened, since laws lacking
legitimacy command little loyalty. 05 Rationality, of course, is
104. See C. BLACK, supra note 98, at 36 (the lack of such legitimacy "must
surely enfeeble [the government] and strip it of moral force"); J. FREEDMAN,
CRisis AND LEGITIMACY 10 (1978). See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SO-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 130-32 (T. Parsons ed. 1947); Tribe, supra
note 17; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The validity and moral authority of
a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached.... No bet-
ter instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person...
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way
been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government,
that justice has been done.").
This section is concerned primarily with formal legitimacy, that is, the le-
gitimacy of process referred to by Frankfurter in the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee case, rather than the legitimacy of result. See C. BLACK, supra note
98, at 38 (distinguishing between formal and substantive legitimacy).
105. See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, supra note 104, at 10. Freedman identifies a
number of aspects of the administrative process that safeguard legitimacy, in-
cluding the following: (1) the decisionmaker is effective; (2) the decisionmaker
is accountable; and (3) the public perceives the decisionmaker as fair. Id. at 11.
All three of these aspects of legitimacy are eroded if lawmakers can with impu-
nity ignore affirmative rationality. Lawmakers who permit archaic laws to re-
main on the books, even after their attention has been drawn to them, are
certainly not effective decisionmakers. Nor are such decisionmakers accounta-
ble if they can suppress information that would reveal their poor performance
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not the only element of legitimacy. If it were, a tyrant could
claim legitimacy merely by employing experts and technocrats
to advise him. But it is clear that rationality is an important
part of legitimacy,106 especially in connection with penal laws,
because of the fundamental ways in which these laws order our
lives.107 Any irrationality perceived in connection with these
laws will greatly erode the feeling of legitimacy upon which re-
spect for the rule of law is based.
The legitimacy that a rational foundation gives criminal
laws is also essential to preserve the human dignity of individ-
ual citizens. Without a foundation of rationality, laws may
eventually be viewed as nothing more than naked exercises of
power to which citizens accede out of fear rather than by
choice. As Jerome Hall has pointed out:
So long as that legal institution [criminal law] survives in its essential
rational and ethical character, even the least of men is given some as-
surance of human worth. By like token, if people come to believe that
the foundation of the criminal law is unsound, a new strange era in our
history will have arrived. 10 8
Certainly, one of the judiciary's natural roles is to assume re-
sponsibility for preventing the arrival of this "new strange era."
An additional aspect of legitimacy that favors the protec-
tion of active rationality is the effect of legitimacy on the utility
of criminal laws. Without the specific protection of active ra-
tionality, the social cohesion effect'0 9 of criminal laws is likely
to their constituency. See text accompanying notes 125-133 infra. Moreover, if
a lawmaker fails to reconsider a statute once a case has been made against it
by means of second-order evidence, citizens will begin to doubt the fairness of
the system.
106. Perhaps rationality is essential for the reason that citizens must be-
lieve that they could put themselves in the place of a legislator, work through
his calculations, and arrive at the same result. Cf. C. BLAciK, supra note 98, at
38 (formal aspect of legitimacy achieved when lawmakers adhere to accepted
forms of policy-making); Tribe, supra note 17 (structural due process defined
as a set of adjustments aimed at producing a consensus among citizenry and
lawmakers). Legitimacy, then, would presuppose rationality out of political-
epistemological necessity: to say that laws must be rational is to specify, in
part, what we mean by "good" laws. A good law would thus be one that is
sound or valid, though not necessarily morally impeccable.
The present argument can also be transposed into utilitarian economic
terms. The effective operation of a self-interest-based free-market system re-
quires rational laws, including penal ones, so that individual behavior will cor-
respond to the public good. Without this correspondence, rational
entrepreneurs would become discouraged, since they would be penalized in
ways that are not calculated to maximize private profit or public gain.
107. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (in criminal trials,
prosecutor must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of importance
of interest at stake).
108. J. HALT, SCIENCE, COMMON SENSE AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 4 (1963).
109. See generally P. DEvUN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MOB-US (1968).
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to suffer because laws that are perceived as questionable are
difficult to enforce.110 There is an additional danger that the
contempt for lawmakers that citizens come to feel when dubi-
ous criminal laws are enforced may become generalized so that
citizens begin to view most criminal laws as ridiculous or op-
pressive."'
2. Integrity of the Political Process
Closely related to society's interest in protecting legitimacy
is the interest that courts have often expressed in protecting
the effective functioning of our society's political processes.l"2
This interest subsumes our concept of active rationality in two
respects. First, courts might feel a concern for the integrity of
the political process if it appeared to them that a coordinate
branch of government is isolating itself from the influence of
facts that might reveal that certain statutes are in need of mod-
ification or repeal. Second, courts might be concerned if a coor-
110. See, e.g., S. REI, CRIvm AND CRIMINOLOGY 44 (1976). See generally J.
KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBrION (1970). These types of laws tend to
be widely violated. This situation makes it difficult to obtain complaints, tips,
and clues necessary for enforcement. It therefore encourages the police to re-
sort to entrapment, paid informers, spying, bugging, and other unsavory en-
forcement techniques that further erode respect for the law. See S. REM,
supra, at 42-45.
That developing nations and revolutionary societies make penal reform an
early order of business, see, e.g., F. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL PoLincs 549-50
(7th ed. 1969); E. SCHUR, LAw AND SOCIETY 118-21 (1968) (post-Stalin increase in
harsh criminal treatment for "parasites" and those guilty of crimes against the
state), and that in our own society intense interest has been generated in re-
forming statutes that make homosexuality, abortion, and drug use criminal of-
fenses, suggests that pressure for law reform is especially strong during
periods of pronounced social change.
111. It is worth observing that legitimacy-based arguments are not exclu-
sively weapons of progressive or left-leaning reformers. Careful empirical stud-
ies may well show that laws penalizing conduct such as sodomy and drug use
are sound, or even that the penalties should be increased.
112. Courts have protected voting rights, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); political representation, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); access to courts for test cases,
e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31
(1963); and political speech, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The
process of social and political decisionmaking is one of the most highly pro-
tected interests in our system of jurisprudence. See, e.g., Karst, Foreword-
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. I REV. 1 (1977);
see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(action that affects "the indispensable condition of an open as against a closed
society" deserves searching judicial scrutiny); Spece, A Purposive Analysis of
Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review and a Practical Assessment of the
Constitutionality of Regulating Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1281, 1289 & n.16, 1290-93 (1978) (discussing the purposes of judicial review, in-
cluding the improvement of the political process).
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dinate branch of government were to create impediments to
the information-generating processes that citizens rely on to as-
sert their interests in a political system premised on consent.
Applied to either of these aspects of the political process, active
rationality would protect interests very much like the "footnote
four" interests discussed by Justice Stone in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. n'3-interests that courts protect with
special vigilance because they are essential to the proper func-
tioning of representative government."
4
Another reason why courts can be expected to be receptive
to the concept of affirmative rationality is its close connection
with political openness. Lawrence Tribe's interpretation of the
irrebuttable presumption cases as aimed at the protection of
this value has already been discussed." 5 In a recent article,
113. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In the famous "footnote four" of his Carolene Prod-
ucts opinion, Justice Stone observed:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny ... than are most other types of legis-
lation.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). One of these suspect re-
strictions of the political process explicitly referred to by Justice Stone was "re-
straints upon the dissemination of information." Id. at 153 n.4. Thus, the
interest in active rationality could be considered a "footnote four" interest,
since without an adequate informational basis, citizens are unable to partici-
pate effectively in the political process. See generally Delgado & Millen, supra
note 6; Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37
MD. L REv. 451 (1978); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 904-05 & n.18; Emer-
son, Legal Foundation of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
114. The process of judicial review has been criticized as undemocratic and
counter-majoritarian, see, e.g., A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRAHCH 16
(1962); Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-c-Vis the States: The Dispen-
sability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1976); Choper, The Supreme
Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA.
L REV. 810, 815 (1974); McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissent-
ing Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354, 359 (1966); however, the rationality form of
review proposed in this Article is less susceptible to this criticism, since it
serves to protect one of the notable means by which people exercise their polit-
ical prerogatives. See note 113 supra. See generally Bishin, Judicial Review in
Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1977) (judicial review is a protec-
tive force for popular participation in political processes).
115. See generally Tribe, supra note 17; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968) (Court struck down rule excluding jurors who admitted to hav-
ing scruples against death penalty, since jury service is a door to citizen partici-
pation in political and moral *change that cannot be arbitrarily closed).
Professor Tribe argues that Witherspoon, like Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), see notes
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Gerald Gunther has expressed the view that courts are moving
toward a multi-tiered system of review that, among other
things, would protect political openness." 6 Multi-tiered review,
which emphasizes means-ends congruence, "place [s] a greater
burden on the state to come forth with explanations"" 7 of the
ways in which its laws serve their purported ends. Gunther
posits that this is a proper and respectful stance for courts to
take vis-A-vis the legislature, and that it does not constitute a
revival of the excesses of substantive due process." 8
Both Tribe's and Gunther's hypotheses, like the concept of
active rationality advocated in this Article, are highly protective
of formal," 9 but not substantive rationality. The individualized
treatment advocated by Professor Tribe would protect our in-
terest in the "freezing" or "thawing" of rules at appropriate mo-
ments in the social dialectic. Similarly, Professor Gunther's
means-ends review authorizes judicial invasion of the legisla-
tive domain only when certain formal evidence of irrationality
appears: a statute fails to advance its own ends, or does so in
an unreasonably overinclusive manner. Since both Tribe's and
Gunther's proposals justify intervention only on formal
grounds, they support judicial remands of matter for legislative
reconsideration, but not with specific instructions to reach a
certain result. The court simply directs the legislature to redo
that which was earlier done improperly. On remand, the legis-
lature may enact a very similar statute, but it will do so in an
atmosphere of greater public attention.
The writings of first amendment theorists also suggest that
courts should not permit the state to exploit a monopoly power
it may have over the means for generating certain sorts of
knowledge. According to Emerson and Meiklejohn, the system
of free expression exists to facilitate the effective operation of
the mechanisms by which we govern ourselves.120 Prime
88-97 supra and accompanying text, shows the Court's desire to ensure that the
government confront the divergent views necessary to sustain an ongoing so-
cial dialectic.
116. "Means scrutiny ... can improve the quality of the political process-
without second-guessing the substantive validity of its results-by encouraging
a fuller airing ... of the grounds for legislative action." Gunther, supra note 1,
at 44.
117. Id. at 20-21.
118. See id. at 44-48.
119. Cf. Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process of Enactment:
An Assessment Following Childers v. Couey, 30 ALA. L. REV. 495 (1979) (dis-
cussing judicial review of the regularity of process by which a bill was enacted,
including being read, voted on, enrolled, and finally signed).
120. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
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among these mechanisms are those that enable us to arrive at
new political or social consensuses. 12 1 Professor Kenneth
Karst's principle of equality in the field of ideas12 2 also sup-
ports a judicially enforced requirement that the legislature not
use its powers to promote an uneven or disorderly growth of
knowledge in order to sustain favored laws, structures, or ideas
beyond the time when they would ordinarily be cast aside.
123
Although Professor Karst's principle appears to have been for-
mulated with reference to facts and ideas already in existence,
rather than ones that remained to be unearthed, the same poli-
cies that underlie his principle argue for equality among undis-
covered facts.12
4
The same concern for developmental rationality is evident
in the writings of constitutional right-to-know theorists.
Thomas Emerson has argued that the right to know should be,
and to some extent already is, protected as a necessary recipro-
cal of the rights to speak, teach, and publish.125 "The dissemi-
nation of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would
be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers." 26 Courts have protected the right to know in contexts
such as advertising,127 academic freedom,128 broadcasting,129
OF THE PEOPLE 14-19, 25-27 (1960); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 882-84 (1963); Meiklejohn, The First Amend-
ment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255.
121. See generally authorities cited in note 120 supra; cases cited in note 112
supras
122. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. Cm. I REv. 20 (1975).
123. Compare Karst, supra note 122, at 20, with Emerson, supra note 120, at
882-86. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 120, at 25-27; see also Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (content censorship); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (allowing the government to act selectively frustrates the political
dynamic on which we rely for effective self-government).
124. Indeed, the policies may argue more strongly in favor of equality
among undiscovered facts. This is because a truth, once known, tends to
spread. Attempted repression of such facts will ultimately prove self-defeating,
since underground networks and anonymous communications will promote dis-
semination. See Delgado & Millen, supra note 6, at 367-68. Ideas that cannot be
imagined or tested are far more vulnerable, since a tyrannical government can
ensure that certain ideas or theories never become current, simply by banning
certain types of inquiry.
125. See Emerson, supra note 120, at 881-82. See also A. BICKEL, supra note
114.
126. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring).
127. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
128. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S 109, 112 (1959).
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and religious pamphleteering.130 The intent has been not only
to protect the primary right-expression-but to encourage
other valued objectives: the maintenance of a "balance be-
tween stability and change in the society," the discovery of the
truth, and the participation of citizens "in social, including po-
litical, decision-making."131 If the right to know were recog-
nized as a protected interest under the first amendment, the
equal protection guarantee might require that the government
avoid favoring the generation of one idea over another, at least
without good reason.132 Accordingly, an alternative means of
gaining access to the information necessary for initiating penal
reform would be to give criminal defendants standing to assert
the rights of either the researchers or citizens who would bene-
fit from the dissemination of such information.1
33
Writing in a slightly different vein, Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis has traced the career of legislative facts. In his treatise
on administrative law, Davis observes that legislative facts are
typically discovered or invented by courts and administrative
agencies and then are enshrined as legal precedent or as judi-
cially noticed facts.13 4 In the years that follow, the process is
reversed and the facts are slowly abandoned as they come to
be seen as archaic or obsolete. If it is to operate smoothly, this
process requires the active involvement of courts, administra-
tive factfinders, and legislatures. Davis believes that the inter-
action of these bodies in developing or abandoning such facts is
essential to the health of society. 35 Although he never appears
to address the problem of deliberate or inadvertent informa-
129. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
130. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943).
131. Emerson, supra note 120, at 878-79. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-8 (1970); Emerson, supra note 120, at 878-86.
132. See generally Karst, The Supreme Cour4 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977).
133. For a discussion of researchers' need for information, see Delgado &
Millen, supra note 6. See also Robertson, supra note 8. A number of commen-
tators have identified this problem area of the law as one of constitutional mag-
nitude that is bound to require Supreme Court attention in the near future.
See, e.g., Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First
Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1977) ("Courts must soon decide
... whether certain kinds of... research may be prohibited or regulated. It is
hard to predict where these issues will lead.") (footnote omitted); Toulmin, Re-
search and the Public Interest, in RESEARCH wrrH RECOMBINANT DNA 101, 103
(1977) ("I ... would predict that a case raising this question will probably
reach the Supreme Court sometime during the next fifteen years or so, and
that the Court will probably decide that freedom of speech does, at least in gen-
eral terms, embrace freedom of scientific inquiry.").
134. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.04 (1st ed. 1958).
135. See generally id. at 338-434 (ch. 15).
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tional blockages that interrupt this developmental process, Da-
vis's discussion has enough overtones of first amendment and
"footnote four" reasoning that it seems likely that he would ap-
prove of judicial activism designed to protect this interest.
IL DEFINING THE RIGHT: THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND
APPROPRIATE REMEDIES
The foregoing discussion suggests that under certain cir-
cumstances courts may decide to impose on the government an
affirmative obligation to ensure the continuing rationality of its
penal statutes. Statutory challenges that rely on the existence
of such a duty are most likely to arise in situations like that of
our paradigm,136 and to be brought under some variant of the
rational basis test.137 When should courts entertain such chal-
lenges? It seems that a challenger should be entitled to relief
when
(1) he presents data, information, or some product of re-
search that appears relevant 38 to a constitutional
challenge of the criminal statute under which he is
charged, and
(2) he presents evidence either that the government has
actively impeded further data collection inquiry, or re-
search, or that it exercises monopoly control over the
field and without good reason 3 9 refuses to carry out
the investigation itself; and
(3) there is good reason to believe that the inquiry will
prove successful.'4o
136. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
137. In this context, the rational basis test is used as a generic term that
comprehends the minimum rationality, strict scrutiny, and intermediate
means-ends tests, see note 1 supra, since each of these tests contains some
form of rationality requirement.
138. The concept of relevancy here is limited by the extent to which a penal
statute purports to be rationally based or is otherwise susceptible to analytical
reconsideration. See text accompanying notes 152-154 infra (not all penal stat-
utes are intended to express instrumental rationality concerns). This view of
the relevancy of data and research findings would result in a graduated scale in
which courts would actively protect rationality more assiduously in some con-
texts than in others. Cf. Gunther, supra note 1, at 20-24 (proposing sliding
scale, multi-tiered model of review in equal protection cases).
139. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent courts from forcing the
government to take unreasonably hasty action. See also note 206 infra (inordi-
nate cost, physical danger, and the inability to obtain or use human subjects
are justifications for refusal to carry out research).
140. See note 24 supra; text accompanying notes 21-24 supra. This require-
ment might also provide that the suspect condition of the challenged statute is
unlikely to prove self-correcting, and that government has given no signs of tak-
ing independent corrective action. This aspect of the requirement is probably
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The intensity with which courts should scrutinize governmen-
tal action or inaction under element (2) would probably vary
according to the extent that any of the following factors ap-
peared to play a causal role: (a) religious intolerance; (b) in-
tergenerational conflict; (c) race, class, or gender-based
animosity; and (d) self-serving bureaucratic inertia.141
If there is a duty for government to ensure developmental
rationality, what should a court do when it finds that the gov-
ernment has breached this duty? It would certainly be an ex-
cessive response for a court immediately to declare the
challenged statute unconstitutional. The challenger, after all,
has produced only second-order evidence; further investigation
may show that the law is in fact justifiable. The only permissi-
ble inference raised by the second-order evidence is that the
legislature has without good reason refused to inquire into mat-
ters when circumstances indicate that it should. The remedy
must be addressed to this problem.
There are a number of feasible remedies. The most draco-
nian would be for the court to impound funds, appoint a scien-
tific magistrate or receiver, and order that the necessary
research be carried out under the court's supervision. The
power of courts to act in this manner could be viewed as an as-
pect of their power to issue orders in aid of discovery.142 This
remedy, which courts could apply only in cases of extreme gov-
ernment intransigence, is similar to remedies that courts have
self-evident, however, and would be applied instinctively by courts out of defer-
ence to the legislative branch.
141. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (arrest of middle-
class children resulted in changes in public climate with respect to reform of
drug laws). See generally P. BREST, supra note 1, at 938 ("[P]olitical pressures
and biases may compromise the objectivity of [legislative] investigations."); M.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JuDiCIL REVIEw 32-37
(1966) (heightened judicial concern appropriate where legislature ignores
rights of minority groups or individuals because of lobbying or public pres-
sure); Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge:
An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L.
REV. 971, 996-97 (1970) (racial animosities underlie marijuana and opium stat-
utes); Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a
Moral Crusade, 16 Soc. PROB. 143 (1968) (bureaucratic inertia aids in persis-
tence of marijuana and other drug laws); Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of
Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 30-32, 45 (1973)
(religious intolerance and bureaucratic inertia can block legislative function).
It seems likely that the degree to which a court would actively protect ra-
tionality will also vary according to: (1) the manner in which the challenged
statute infringes upon liberty, judged according to the severity of its penalties;
and (2) the extent to which remediation can be accomplished quickly and inex-
pensively (e.g., through an inexpensive study or review of literature).
142. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 34, 37.
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applied when faced with recalcitrant school boards, jail admin-
istrators, or state mental health authorities.143
A less drastic remedy would be for a court to shift to the
government the burden of proving that the statute is affirma-
tively rational. 4 4 In other words, if a petitioner presents
enough second-order evidence that the state has been remiss in
its housekeeping, the presumption that the state is adequately
policing its own statute books would dissolve, at least with re-
spect to the statute in question. The state would then be re-
quired to show that a sound factual basis for the statute
remains; this soundness would be measured not only against
the evidence available at the time of the statute's enactment,
but also against all information currently within reach. 45 If the
state fails to satisfy this burden, the court would simply refuse
to enforce the statute. If the state fails to meet its burden in a
series of cases dealing with the same statute, the continuing
embarrassment, cost, and public clamor will presumably cause
it to reconsider its position. The difference between this rem-
edy and the first, then, is that in this case the statute remains
in effect but simply becomes much more costly to administer.
Of course, since defendants would learn quickly that the stat-
ute had been denied effect in a series of cases, it would become
a "marked man." 46
Another possible remedy would be to suspend operation of
the statute until the court is satisfied that the legislature has
143. See note 86 supra. Compare Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505
F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974) ("Lack of funds is not an acceptable excuse for un-
constitutional conditions of incarceration.") and Vest v. Lubbock County
Comm'rs Ct., 444 F. Supp. 824, 834 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (refusal to accept govern-
ment's plea of lack of funds) with Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233
(1964) (Court threatened to force levy for school desegregation funds) and
United States v. County of Clark, 96 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1877) (Court required that
judgment creditor of Clark County be paid out of funds in county treasury).
144. This is essentially what courts do when a challenged statute implicates
a fundamental liberty or burdens a suspect class.
145. There is apparently still some disagreement over the proper allocation
of burdens when the Court employs minimum rationality review. For the view
that the burden shifts at various points of proof, see P. BREST, supra note 1, at
1005-06. Where the government is demonstrably responsible for the chal-
lenger's predicament, functional considerations suggest that the burden of
proof with respect to constitutional or legislative facts should be placed, at least
initially, on the government. See note 44 supra (considerations of policy,
probability, and fairness argue for allocation of the burden of proof to the gov-
ernment).
146. This approach is consistent with the dialectic-protecting, experiment-
forcing approach that Professor Tribe attributes to the irrebuttable presump-
tion cases. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
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carried out the necessary studies or further inquiries.147 For
the duration of the suspension, no prosecutions could be
brought under the statute. This remedy would be an interme-
diate solution, less harsh than striking down the statute, but
more severe than suspending the statute only as it applies to a
single defendant. In this respect, the remedy operates as an in-
terim measure like a temporary restraining order or an injunc-
tion; it is issued to protect the status quo until more definite
proof is brought forth by the parties.148
Yet another alternative, milder than any discussed so far,
would be for a court to require that the government simply
lower any barriers it has erected against private research. This
remedy would do nothing to alter the status of the statute it-
self, since it would remain in effect while the research was car-
ried out. Moreover, the court would retain neither continuing
jurisdiction over the controversy nor supervisory control over
the investigation. Therefore, the defendant who brought the
statutory challenge would gain no immediate personal benefit.
Instead, any change in the legislation would await the results of
further study, and the operation of the slow-moving mecha-
nisms by which an informed public convinces its government to
change malevolent or obsolete legislation: lobbying, letters, pe-
titions, discussions in the press, and so forth.149 One last possi-
147. The effect of this remedy would be similar to a legislative "remand."
See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENvIRONmENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN
ACTION 175 (1971); Bickel & Wellington, supra note 45, at 31-35.
148. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 109 (1973). Per-
haps a further justification for temporarily suspending certain statutes can be
made by analogy to the doctrines of lapse and abandonment. Because of its in-
attention to a statute that covers a matter in a rapidly changing field, the legis-
lature could be deemed to have abandoned it. Alternatively, rapidly changing
conditions could be seen as bringing about the statute's constructive lapse.
While a statute is in this suspended state, either party could conduct research.
Ideally, the results of this research would demonstrate conclusively either that
the statute -is constitutionally infirm or that it is indeed rational. If neither
party came forward with new evidence, or if the evidence was hopelessly incon-
clusive, the statute would remain suspended indefinitely.
149. See D'Amato, Environmental Degradation and Legal Action, 26 BULL.
ATOM. SCL 24, 25 (Mar. 1970) ("As the public becomes more concerned.., it
will follow that judges, reading the same newspapers and magazines, will also
begin to want to do something about the problem .... Public education, there-
fore, will have a direct effect upon the law as well as upon the public."); Loev-
inger, Jurimetrics: Science in Law, in SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 21
(W. Thomas ed. 1974) ("In a democracy the most appropriate and promising
method for incorporating scientific knowledge into public law is public dia-
logue. This is the method by which other disciplines... make their contribu-
tion to government and exert their influence on public policy. There is no
reason to claim a preferred position for science."). See generally E. PATTERSON,
LAw IN A SCIENTIFmC AGE 33-34 (1963); Miller, Technology, Social Change, and
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ble solution would be for the court to examine the enabling
legislation creating administrative agencies having jurisdiction
over areas that touch penal administration. By interpreting
these statutory provisions liberally, a court might find that cer-
tain administrative agencies have a statutory responsibility to
study or carry out research in an area under attack. Our crimi-
nal defendant could then request a declaration that the penal
statute is irrational since it is unsupported by research that the
legislature ordered the agency to carry out. In the alternative,
our defendant could ask that the operation of the statute be
suspended until the agency carries out studies that are
designed to determine whether the penal statute is in fact ra-
tional. The difficulty with this remedy, of course, is finding an
agency with statutory jurisdiction over the challenged subject
matter.150
III. DIFFICULTIES WITH IMPOSING A DUTY OF ACTIVE
OR DEVELOPMENTAL RATIONALITY:
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
A. THE MORAL BASIS OF CRIMINAL LAWS
One objection to the concept of active rationality developed
in this Article is that criminal laws need not be rational at all
because they are merely symbolic expressions of the innate
loathing we feel for certain forms of behavior. For example, so-
ciety prohibits murder and sodomy not because there is some
instrumentally rational reason for doing so, or because the pro-
hibition serves some extrinsic goal, but rather because these
acts violate deeply held social convictions concerning moral be-
the Constitution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 17, 18 (1964) (technological change has
mediate as well as immediate effects on public perceptions and policies).
150. In order to lend some viability to this remedy, the government could
create a single agency charged with the responsibility of maintaining a re-
search agenda relating to the administration of penal laws. This obligation
could be added to the responsibilities of an existing agency such as the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration. Cf. Note, Enforcing a Congressional
Mandate: LEAA and Civil Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 721, 739 (1976) (urging judicial
review to ensure that the LEAA adheres to its statutory obligation to disburse
grant funds only to grantees who do not subvert civil rights). Alternatively, an
entirely new agency could be set up.
There is a danger, of course, that government-sponsored research could
prove self-serving or biased in favor of existing scientific knowledge. But this
risk can be dealt with in the ways that scientists usually deal with dishonest or
methodologically unsound work. criticism and replication of the questionable
work. In a cise in which the court actually believed that the government would
be tempted to slant its research results to support a questionable statute, the




havior.' 5 ' Facts and values inhabit different moral universes;
one cannot derive an ought from an is.152
A partial response to this objection is that this generalized
description simply does not fit all penal legislation. Many penal
statutes are enacted primarily for regulatory reasons-they
promote purposes that we agree are good. 53 These more in-
strumental penal laws can be attacked by showing that the be-
havior they prohibit is harmless, or that the prohibition does
not advance the statute's purported goal.' 54 Moreover, regard-
less of whether a regulatory penal statute prohibits harmless
behavior or fails to advance its purported goals, there are many
other kinds of factual showings 55 that may render it of ques-
tionable validity. For instance, a criminal defendant may wish
to show that the statute trenches on areas or classifications
protected by the Constitution 56 or that it fails to govern the
151. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 7 (1968) ("I think ... the
criminal law as we know it is based upon moral principle."). See also Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Hart, Im-
morality and Treason, in MORALIT= AND THE LAw (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971);
Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1967); Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962); Rostow,
The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174.
152. This is termed the "naturalist fallacy." G. MOORE, PRINcn'IA ETHICA 18
(1903). See id. at 15-18.
153. For example, traffic laws exist not because driving slowly or on the
right-hand side of the street is intrinsically good, but because we wish to pro-
mote the extrinsic good of highway safety.
154. A traffic law imposing a speed limit of 30 m.p.h. on a freeway would be
one example. Such a rule could actually lead to more accidents if some drivers
observed the rule while others ignored it and drove at the speeds for which the
highway was designed. Thus, absent some countervailing reason such as con-
serving fuel, a court might overturn such a rule as irrational.
155. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of fact issues, see Karst, supra
note 102, at 86. For a model of legislative action that emphasizes the impor-
tance of factfinding and instrumental rationality, see Cohen, Hearing on a Bilk
Legislative Folklore?, 37 MINN. L. REV. 34 (1952) (concluding that the hearing
process ought to be made even more reliable by incorporating expert, nonparti-
san testimony and reports). See also E. PATrERSON, LAw IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE
17 (1963) ("May one not generalize further and say that no crevice or cranny of
our legal order is immune from some revision or modification because of the
persuasive influence of newly emerging facts?").
156. The challenged statute may have a "chilling effect" on the freedom of
expression. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-48
(1941). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (test for whether
a criminal statute only incidentally burdens freedom of expression). Alterna-
tively, the statute may have an adverse impact on some other constitutionally
protected liberty. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The
statute, even if facially neutral, may instead have an unreasonably adverse im-
pact on racial minorities. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (rejecting
equal application theory of Virginia's antimiscegenation law); cf. Griggs v.
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conduct in question by sufficiently precise means.157 A defend-
ant may also be able to show that the criminalized behavior is
physically caused and not within his power to control. 5 8
Even the most purely noninstrumental, morals-based regu-
lations, however, may be susceptible to factual arguments.
Dworkin has pointed out that legal norms, to be defensible,
must be capable of being supported with good reasons.1 59 Laws
without foundation in good reasons cannot be distinguished
from the personal preferences, prejudices, or quirks of the law-
giver,160 and are insufficient causes for limiting freedom in a
civilized society.' 6' In terms of active rationality, the significant
aspect of Dworkin's good reasons requirement is that many of
the reasons that justify penal laws are either wholly or partly
factual.162 It is apparent, then, that the set of criminal statutes
impervious to factually-based rationality attacks is much
smaller than might be thought. A criminal defendant should at
least be given the opportunity to argue that the statute he
wishes to challenge is one that is vulnerable in this respect.1
63
A variation of this objection is that criminal laws are imper-
vious to rational-basis review not because they embody unas-
sailable moral judgments, but because like all laws they
represent nothing more than the legislature's market-like rec-
onciliation of competing forces. Under this "public choice"
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (facially neutral employment test vio-
lates title VII of the Civil Rights Act because of its adverse effect on blacks).
157. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (state-imposed dep-
rivation of a fundamental interest must be narrow in scope).
158. This sort of factual showing might help a criminal defendant attack a
conviction based on acts similar to sleepwalking or other automatic acts. See,
e.g., Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 191-92 (1879); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 26 (West Supp. 1979); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). A
related showing would be that the statute penalizes a status rather than an act,
or that the perpetrators are mentally ill rather than malevolent. See Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
159. Dworkin, supra note 152, at 996-1004.
160. Id. at 996. Thus, under Dworkin's view, it would not be enough to say
"I am against sodomy because I find it disgusting." It might, however, be ade-
quate to say "I am against sodomy because it disequips the sodomist for mar-
riage or parenthood, and threatens the family as an institution."
161. Id. at 1004.
162. Id. at 996-98.
163. For other views of the way in which the world of facts impinges on
morals-based legislation or moral discourse in general, see K. POPPER, THE
POVERTY OF HIsTORICISM 64-66 (1957); Weber, The Meaning of "Ethical Neutral-
ity" in Sociology and Economics, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES 20-21 (E. Shils & H. Finch eds. 1949); P. Hauser, The Chaotic Society:
Product of the Social Morphological Revolution, 34 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 15 (1969);




model of the legislative process,164 one may not assume that
the process is designed to produce instrumentally rational
laws. Rather, laws represent compromises calculated to satisfy
the various interest groups that manage to make their presence
felt in the legislative arena; they are products of a log-rolling
contest between these groups rather than of a principled and
serious inquiry. If it is true that laws do not result from a
search for rationality, but are merely struck bargains, then it
can be argued that a rationality based standard of judicial re-
view is wholly inappropriate. It would impose on the legisla-
ture a duty to do something of which it is institutionally
incapable.
Although this is not the place for an extended discussion of
the public choice model, three brief observations can be made.
First, even if the public choice model gives a reasonably accu-
rate approximation of the process by which general economic
legislation is enacted, it is far less adequate for describing the
formulation of penal legislation.' 65 Second, regardless of
whether the public choice model is an accurate characteriza-
tion of legislative behavior, it does not logically follow that the
model renders laws impervious to rationality based review.
The model does not require that legislatures forsake instru-
mental rationality, it merely explains that they often do; a
model that simply explains a facet of the legislative process
cannot disable courts from reviewing the rationality of stat-
utes. 6 6 Third, it can even be argued that the public choice
164. For an explanation of the competing "public choice" and "public inter-
est" models of legislative action, see Michelman, Political Markets and Commu-
nity Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J 145 (1978). See also Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking,
55 NB. L. REv. 195 (1976).
165. See Bice, supra note 2, at 28-36, 78-86 (public choice model fits some
contexts better than others). There are a number of specific restraints upon
the enactment of criminal laws. Some are constitutional-the prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment and against ex post facto laws, as well
as the procedural guarantees of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments-while
others, like the mens rea requirement, have common law origins. There is also
the traditional requirement that punishment serve the purposes of deterrence,
retribution, societal safety, or rehabilitation. These restraints limit what the
legislature may do in enacting penal legislation, and thereby place a limit on
the logrolling aspect of the public choice model of lawmaking.
166. If the public choice model did in fact describe a process that produces
laws impervious to rationality-based review, then all forms of judicial review,
not just active rationality, would be improper. Obviously, this is not the path
our jurisprudence has taken; judicial review has been seen as a limiting force,
the purpose of which is to ensure that the legislature respects values basic to
our system. See Bice, supra note 2, at 114-16. See generally Michelman, supra
note 165. Thus, active rationality is part of a tradition that stretches back to
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model describes a legislative marketplace that, when perfectly
competitive, will inexorably produce rational legislation, just as
a perfectly competitive economic marketplace will inexorably
lead to rational production. Under this view of the public
choice model, irrational legislation can result only from imper-
fect competition in the legislative marketplace, and rationality-
based judicial review would be nothing more than a search for
laws produced in an imperfectly competitive marketplace.1
67
Thus, once it is understood that the public choice model de-
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and the Constitutional Con-
vention.
Scientific, rationalist thought was central to the political ideals of the fram-
ers of our Constitution. Science was seen as the paradigm of truth-seeking ac-
tivity, a model that politics should emulate whenever possible. Many of the
leading colonial figures were scientists in their own right; virtually all were
steeped in Enlightenment thought. See, e.g., E. BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHI-
LOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1938); B. HINDLE, THE PURSUIT OF ScI-
ENCE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1735-1789, at 381-82 (1956); R. HOFSTADTER &
W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
61-62 (1955); C. PATERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 188-89 (1953); Emerson, supra note 133, at 740-45. Political theory of that
time borrowed its basic values and metaphors from science, and politics in turn
supplied some fundamental notions for science. See J. CROWTHER, FAMOUS
AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE 138, 148-49 (1937); Delgado & Millen, supra note 6, at
355. James Madison, for example, believed that laws for governments could be
derived from a systematic study of the natural world, carried out according to
the method of "science." J. CROWTHER, supra, at 141; E. BURNS, supra, at 24-25.
The principal obstacles to the establishment of a rational political system were
seen as ignorance, superstition, and dogma. See C. PATTERSON, supra, at 188-89;
A. KOCH, MADISON'S "ADVICE To MY COUNTRY" 35 (1966); D. PRICE, THE SCIEN-
TIFIC ESTATE 86-88 (1965); Delgado & Millen, supra note 6, at 355-57. The early
colonials even formed scientific societies, and relied on their advice in matters
concerning agriculture, health, and public works. See R. BATES, SCIENTIFIC So-
CIETIES IN THE UNrrED STATES (3d ed. 1965).
167. The "logrolling" aspect of the public choice model emphasizes the
manner in which interest groups assert themselves through lobbying, initia-
tives, and other forms of arm-wringing carried out in the halls of legislatures. If
all interest groups in society were equally able to express themselves to the
legislature in this manner, the interplay of competing self-interested forces
would lead to rational legislative production, just as in a perfectly competitive
economic market, the interplay of competing self-interested firms leads to effi-
cient (i.e., rational) production. If competition in the legislative marketplace
were perfect, judicial review would not only be counter-majoritarian, but also
counterrational, since the legislative process would be incapable of producing
irrational secular legislation. Of course, the problem with the economic com-
petitive market model is that extrinsic forces prevent markets from becoming
perfectly competitive; thus, production is inefficient. The same problem exists
with the public choice model; since extraneous forces prevent certain interest
groups from competing effectively in the legislative marketplace, legislation
will sometimes be irrational. Thus, under the public choice model, when a
court finds that a law is irrational, it has actually identified an instance in
which the working of the legislative marketplace has flagrantly deviated from
the ideal process presumed by the public choice model.
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scribes a process that produces rational laws168 whenever the
legislative marketplace is perfectly competitive, but that the
legislative marketplace is sometimes flagrantly noncompeti-
tive,169 judicial review becomes perfectly compatible with the
model. Judicial review represents nothing more than a formal
check on the structure of legislative decisionmaking;17 0 it would
remand legislation only when it appears that the legislative
process has deviated significantly from the ideal hypothesized
by the public choice model.171
B. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
If a court finds a lack of legislative diligence and actually
168. The term "rational," as it is used here, is not meant to convey any judg-
ment concerning metaphysical or logical sufficiency. Rather, it is used in the
same sense as rational production in an efficient economic market, where ra-
tionality simply reflects an optimal allocation of resources given the various
forces competing with the market. Thus, in a perfectly efficient legislative mar-
ketplace, rational legislation would reflect an optimal allocation of benefits and
disbenefits throughout society given the various social and economic forces
competing within the marketplace. This conception of rationality is dynamic; it
is not a static value of positive law, but varies along with the constantly chang-
ing levels of influence exerted by discrete segments of society.
169. In order for the legislative marketplace to be perfectly competitive, it is
not sufficient for all interest groups merely to have access to legislators. It is
also necessary that interest groups have the ability to recognize their own self-
interest. Factual knowledge is often a prerequisite to recognizing self-interest,
and if facts have been suppressed, the logrolling function stressed by public
choice theorists functions poorly even if access to the legislature is perfect. Ac-
tive rationality, then, is not a means of subverting the logrolling function;
rather, it is a means of ensuring its integrity by requiring that all the interest
groups involved have adequate factual knowledge.
Even Linde, the foremost advocate of the public choice model, recognizes
that legislatures must "duly consider" bills before enacting them, and that
"[o] ur institutions and procedures are designed to curb power to make law ca-
priciously, on merely personal or inarticulate impulse." Linde, supra note 165,
at 253. These mechanisms are necessary for protecting political legitimacy. See
id. at 254-55. Thus, even Linde's view that courts may only insist that legisla-
tures duly consider a law before enacting it is consistent with the view advo-
cated here, since a lawmaker who deliberately chose not to hear the informed
voice of interest groups would clearly be guilty of inadequate consideration.
170. See notes 115-119 supra and accompanying text.
171. The case for active rationality review in our paradigm situation may be
even stronger than the generalized case for judicial review. Even if the log-roll-
ing function has operated efficiently, that is, all interest groups have had access
to the legislature, see note 168 supra, and all necessary factual data have been
available, see note 170 supra, conditions may change over time. It is possible
that new factual data, if injected into the legislative process, would produce
laws opposite to those that now exist. When there is second-order evidence
that such facts are available, a judicial remand of legislation would not consti-
tute an attack upon the logrolling process, but rather a method of ensuring that
changing conditions do not subvert the integrity of the process.
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puts into effect one of the remedies discussed earlier,172 a sec-
ond objection arises: that the court has invaded the domain of
the legislature in violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine. 7
3
1. Institutional Competence of Courts
One aspect of the separation of powers doctrine revolves
around the institutional shortcomings of courts. It can be ar-
gued that courts, by their very nature, are incapable of carrying
out the complex fact-finding required by the type of statutory
challenge contemplated in our paradigm. 7 4 What this objec-
tion overlooks, however, is that in our paradigm the court's task
is limited to ascertaining whether second-order evidence exists.
The court need only decide whether the challenger has shown
that the government has without good reason failed to pursue
first-order evidence affecting the statute's constitutionality.7 5
This requires little in the way of elaborate fact-finding. Rather,
the court must only determine whether the challenger has
presented evidence of inadequate diligence on the part of the
state in gathering information. Courts, as we have seen, rou-
tinely process this sort of evidence under varying degrees of
scrutiny. 7 6 Furthermore, they are accustomed to imposing
penalties on parties, including governmental ones, who fail to
comply with informational requirements. 7 7 The institutional
competency aspect of the separation of powers principle, then,
offers little theoretical or practical difficulty for courts con-
fronted with cases like our paradigm.
It may even be that courts are more competent than legis-
latures to deal with the second-order evidence problem. People
may be unaware of an outmoded penal law unless they find
172. See text accompanying notes 142-151 supra. We can eliminate from
discussion remedies as mild as the politely worded exhortations to greater dili-
gence issued by the courts in Ward and Castro, see text accompanying notes 9-
16 supra, since these are likely to strike no one as offensive. It is the applica-
tion of more coercive measures, such as suspending a statute's operation, that
is certain to provoke the complaint that the court has invaded the province of a
coordinate branch of government.
173. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 2-2, at 15-17.
174. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). See
also BREST, supra note 1, at 941, 981-83 (legislatures are generally more quali-
fied to carry out novel factfinding than courts).
175. The prima facie case is discussed in text accompanying notes 136-141
supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
177. See notes 31, 86 supra and accompanying text.
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themselves charged with a crime under it.178 Or, a person may
know of an outmoded penal law yet be simply too unconcerned
to question it until brought into court for violating it; until that
time the threat of wrongful prosecution has seemed too re-
mote.17 9 It is unrealistic to require that such complainants
bring their arguments in a different forum once they have al-
ready been brought before the court. At the same time, the leg-
islative arena may be an unpromising one, because the number
of individuals immediately affected by the questionable law
will undoubtedly be small, and they will probably lack voting or
lobbying power.180 Thus, their plight may not be seen as one
that justifies the attention of the legislature. Moreover, courts
are often in a better position than legislatures to observe the
delayed effects of certain legislation. Statutes may have unin-
tended consequences, for which reviewing courts can serve as
warning systems, alerting the legislature that something is
amiss in the statute books and needs further attention.
2. Usurpation of Legislative Prerogative
Even if courts are a competent, tribunal for protecting ac-
tive rationality, another separation of powers objection can be
raised: that courts engaged in active rationality review are
usurping the powers of a coordinate branch of government.' 8 '
This concern can be answered by pointing out that in situations
like that of our paradigm, there has been a second-order show-
ing that the legislature has abdicated its responsibility by fail-
ing to carry out further investigation of a demonstrably
questionable statute. The legislature has thus left a vacuum
into which another arm of government may properly move,182
178. See S. Bice, supra note 2, at 59-60.
179. The statute may be of a kind that is enforced unevenly or sporadically.
See id. at 60.
180. See id.
181. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880); A. HAMILTON, THE
FEDERAUST No. 51, at 356 (B. Wright ed. 1961); Montesquieu, The Spirit of
Laws, in 38 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 70 (1952); see also A. Bicx-
EL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLIr-
ICs 14, 15 (1962).
182. Cf. A. BicKEI, supra note 181, at 24 (criteria for active judicial review
include that the function be one "not likely [to] be performed elsewhere if the
courts do not assume it"). The "unlawful delegation" cases, see, e.g., National
Cable TV Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958), which hold that an extreme abdication of congressional power to an
agency or other arm of government is unlawful, also support the power of
courts to fill such vacuums. See generally A. BiCKE, supra note 181, at 165-66
(Court's action in some of the unlawful delegation cases constitutes in effect a
remand of the problem to Congress, so that any subsequent abdication will at
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particularly if the entry is brief, self-limiting, and formal rather
than substantive.18 3 As in cases of institutional litigation, when
courts have intervened only after a clear showing of neglect by
prison, school, or mental health authorities,184 courts hearing
statutory challenges would take affirmative action only when
the legislature is clearly guilty of similar neglect. In such cases,
the cry of usurpation rings untrue, because the court has done
nothing that would otherwise have been carried out by another
arm of government. Moreover, most of the remedies that courts
in this situation are likely to impose will consist of measures
designed merely to encourage the inactive branch to reassume
its responsibilities. 85
To be fair, courts have in fact recognized that actively forc-
ing a complex or sensitive legislative issue can place strains on
government. Thus, courts have devised doctrines of restraint
concerning advisory opinions,186 standing,18 7 ripeness,188 and
least appear to be a deliberate choice, subject to correction through its political
consequences); C. BLAcK, supra note 98, at 95 (excessive delegation of a con-
gressional prerogative justifies judicial intervention). Since Congress cannot
delegate a duty that only it is competent to perform, see J. FREEDMAN, supra
note 104, at 87, it would seem that Congress' refusal to carry out a duty such as
checking the validity of its own statutes, while at the same time preventing an-
yone else from performing it, would be even worse. In the latter case, it is a
virtual certainty that the duty will not be discharged; in the former case, the
duty will be discharged, but simply by the wrong body.
Vague criminal statutes have sometimes been declared void under the im-
proper delegation theory. The notion is that the legislature, in drafting a hope-
lessly vague law, unlawfully delegated the task of finding the statute's meaning
to the judiciary. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948); James v. Bow-
man, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). Criminal statutes lacking in developmental rationality
could be treated like these vague statutes, since constitutional status is un-
clear. It could be argued that the legislature has improperly delegated power,
since it has not developed the information necessary for clarifying the statute's
constitutionality.
183. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
184. See note 86 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 148-149 supra. Legislative remands have
recently been proposed by J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENvIRONMENT 175 (1970) and
by Bickel & Wellington, supra note 45, at 10. See also cases cited in note 87
supra (remands to supplement record with legislative or constitutional facts).
186. In United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), the Court ob-
served, "As is well known, the federal courts established pursuant to Article III
of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." Id. at 89. See Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972); Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-
America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The mootness doc-
trine is related to the advisory opinion issue because judicial explanations of
controversies that are in fact moot, though not vacated as such, often amount to
advisory opinions.
187. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975); Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
188. The issue of ripeness often arises in preenforcement suits challenging
the validity of administrative regulations. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v.
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political questions' 89 that permit them to avoid taking a stand
when doing so would produce this sort of strain.190 Although
these doctrines show that courts often decline to step into the
vacuum created when a coordinate branch has abdicated its re-
sponsibilities, they are generally not invoked when courts are
faced with claimants whose dilemmas are pressing and imme-
diate, and which cannot be solved without judicial interven-
tion.19' The purpose of these doctrines is to allow courts to
avoid reaching the merits in difficult cases. In our paradigm
case, however, the merits must be reached if justice is to be
done; our defendant cannot obtain meaningful relief unless the
court finds some way to order the necessary facts developed or
collected. These refined theories of judicial restraint are thus
poor candidates for application to our concept of active ration-
ality.19 2 In judging whether enforcing an obligation of develop-
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Snow,
561 F.2d 227, 236-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Abbott Laboratories, the Court observed
that the rationale of the ripeness doctrine is "to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies
from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized
and its effects felt in a concrete way." 387 U.S. at 148. See generally Vining, Di-
rect Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69
MICH. L. REv. 1443 (1971).
189. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962); Vincent v. Schles-
inger, 388 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1975); Dickson v. Nixon, 379 F. Supp. 1345,
1348 (W.D. Tex. 1974). The standing and mootness doctrines, see notes 187-188
supra, regulate the procedural posture in which issues are presented to the ju-
diciary. "The political question doctrine plays an analogous role in policing the
substantive nature of the problems which litigants seek to have the judiciary
solve." 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, PornmcAL AND CrvnL RIGHTS IN
THE UNIrrED STATES 1528 (4th ed. 1976).
190. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 65, at 495-98; Albert, Justiciability
and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REv.
1139, 1143 (1977).
191. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 65, at 500.
192. Courts usually invoke these doctrines to weed out overzealous plain-
tiffs with premature or otherwise troublesome complaints. There is no good
reason why these doctrines could not be used to penalize underzealous defend-
ants as well. Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b) (dismissal of action for lack of prosecu-
tion). Standing requirements, for example, are designed to ensure that only
plaintiffs who have a genuine stake in the outcome of a case can be party to it.
If the lawmaker has been derelict in its duty to protect the public from irra-
tional criminal statutes, a court might choose to penalize the lawmaker by de-
nying it standing to defend those statutes that it apparently has lost interest in
keeping current. A similar argument can be made under the rubric of ripeness
or justiciability: that government action or inaction has rendered the case
before the court extremely difficult if not impossible to adjudicate fairly.
Perhaps the reason why these suggestions sound novel is that the primary
governmental vice with which courts are usually concerned is excess. "[The]
government is virtually sure to exercise power in debatable ground." C. BLAcK,
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mental rationality would offend basic notions of the proper
roles of courts and legislatures, it should be remembered that it
is a much simpler task to determine when research or study
might be needed than it is to conclude that a statute is in fact
irrational. Making second-order determinations that further
study is needed is therefore less offensive to the separation of
powers doctrine than is outright substantive review. Yet this
latter, more difficult function is one that courts carry out rou-
tinely. In our paradigm the court is not asked to reverse some-
thing that the legislature purports to have found, but merely to
note that the legislature has found nothing because it has failed
to inquire.
3. Reordering the Legislative Agenda
Regardless of whether courts engaged in active rationality
review may be protecting only formal rationality values,193 the
objection remains that in remanding cases for further consider-
ation, courts are drafting the legislature's agenda and imposing
spending priorities on it. The legislature is invested with wide
power and discretion in the area of economic legislation,
1 94
since it is uniquely qualified to weigh competing demands on
the public fisc. 95 If courts in effect mandate spending for fur-
ther research, this will surely have an impact on the legisla-
ture's exercise of its traditional allocative functions. Why
should courts have the power to mandate research into the em-
pirical bases of a statute when a knowledgeable legislator
might prefer to spend the money on cancer research or on low-
cost housing for the aged? Who is to say that ensuring the ra-
tionality of a given law is more important than finding a cure
for a dread disease or remedying the plight of the indigent eld-
erly?
A partial answer is that the government is directly respon-
sible for the laws it enacts, while it is not responsible, at least
supra note 98, at 46. But the underexercise of a power can lead to equally
acute problems, and courts should be willing to adapt legal doctrines to cope
with these situations as well. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (writ of mandamus to
compel an officer of the United States to perform a duty owed to plaintiff).
193. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
194. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934) ("the legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, [and] every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity"). See generally McCloskey, Economic
Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 34.
195. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (federal spending power
invested in Congress); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See generally
McCloskey, supra note 194.
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in the same way, for cancer or poverty.196 A more complete an-
swer, perhaps, is that criminal defendants are entitled to be
governed by rational laws,197 and that this entitlement is one of
the most fundamental in our system of politics. Any breach, or
even the appearance of a breach in this regard, weakens one of
the most basic ingredients of political legitimacy. This aspect
removes spending earmarked for the purpose of validating pe-
nal statutes from the arena of competing legislative priorities,
and places it on a level with spending necessary to guarantee
our basic liberties and physical security.198 Moreover, the legis-
lature's prior refusal to examine the spending problem takes it
out of the discretionary area from which courts normally steer
clear. By its refusal to consider the possible deficiencies of a
challenged statute, the legislature has abdicated its spending
authority and opened the area to the courts.199 Of course, if
there were evidence that the legislature had already examined
the second-order case for reopening inquiry, and nevertheless
decided that the matter warranted no further attention, the leg-
islature's decision would be final.
200
4. Review of Administrative Agencies
A final reason for rejecting the separation of powers objec-
tion stems from similarities between active rationality and the
form of judicial review applied to administrative agency action.
Courts have seldom hesitated to reverse factual findings of ad-
ministrative agencies or to order agencies to carry out further
studies where such action appeared warranted.20 1 The notion
196. The government may have an affirmative obligation to eliminate cancer
and poverty. But if this obligation exists, it is not because the government has
established these evils in a formal, deliberate sense, as it has with penal laws.
The responsibility of government for bad laws, however, is far more direct and
immediate than its responsibility for the physical or fiscal welfare of its citi-
zenry.
197. See text accompanying notes 104-110 (rationality as aspect of legiti-
macy), 112-133 supra (rationality as precondition of effective functioning of po-
litical processes).
198. Judicial activism is at its highest in connection with rights and inter-
ests that are given to the people by our Constitution or political traditions. See
C. BLACK, supra note 98, at 94; P. BREST, supra note 1, at 981-82; McCloskey,
supra note 194, at 45-49.
199. See text accompanying notes 181-182 supra.
200. The same result would occur where it appears that the legislature
found the challenger's second-order evidence convincing, but determined that
the research called for would present insuperable problems of cost, physical
danger, or ethical risl. See note 206 infra.
201. See Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (courts
insist that administrative agencies give "reasoned consideration to all the mate-
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is that when a court coerces an administrative agency, the sep-
aration of powers problem is less acute than when the execu-
tive or legislative branches are more directly affected.202
Perhaps the reason for this is that administrative agencies are
created with definite and articulated goals in mind. Since agen-
cies' goals are already limited, judicial activism in reviewing
their actions seems relatively inoffensive. The review generally
consists of nothing more than examining the instrumental ra-
tionality of measures designed to promote known goals, or pos-
sibly of the data bases upon which such measures are based.
This limited form of review avoids judicial entanglement with
the more purely legislative functions of goal-setting and inter-
est-balancing.
In a number of respects, Congress functions like an admin-
istrative agency when it legislates in the field of criminal law.203
Congress' role in this area is limited in many of the same ways
as the roles of specialized agencies. There are preexisting and
relatively well-defined legislative goals in this area that spring
from the Constitution or centuries of tradition.204 When Con-
gress has attempted to expand or alter these goals, courts have
often intervened and found the proposed changes invalid.205
When it legislates in the area of criminal law, therefore, the
rial facts and issues"); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)
(matter remanded to agency where agency clearly failed to explore important
alternatives or investigate significant issues); Leventhal, Environmental Deci-
sionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Comment,
Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84
YALE UJ. 1750 (1975); note 86 supra and accompanying text. But see Marinoff v.
Department of HEW, 456 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (issuance of writ of
mandamus compelling investigation by HEW into whether or not certain sub-
stances could cure cancer held inappropriate because of generality of Depart-
ment's responsibilities in area and lack of proof that HEW had abused
discretion in refusing to investigate, affd, 595 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 2829 (1979). See also Christie, A Model of Judicial Review of Legisla-
tion, 48 S. CAr. I- REV. 1306 (1975).
202. See generally Linde, supra note 165, at 225.
203. See text accompanying note 86 supra (comparing penal legislation to
agency action); text accompanying note 166 supra.
204. See note 203 supra. See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458
(1965); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); Sauer v. United States,
241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957); Berrigan v. Norton,
322 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D. Conn.), ard, 451 F.2d 790 (1971); K. MENNINGER, THE
CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 254 (1968); Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959) (rehabilitation);
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949
(1966) (deterrence); Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939) (retribution).
205. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory
death sentence held incompatible with individual treatment due offenders).
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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scope of the legislature's function is constrained by the narrow
range of its permissible objectives, just as the scope of an ad-
ministrative agency's functions is constrained by its enabling
act. If courts have the power to tell administrative agencies to
carry out certain functions, to redraft certain guidelines, or to
gather additional information before acting, then it is not un-
reasonable that courts might exercise the same supervisory
power over legislatures in those areas of lawmaking in which
the legislature's authority is similarly circumscribed by law.
C. THE NATURE OF SECOND-ORDER EVIDENCE
Another problem with active rationality concerns the suita-
bility of second-order evidence as the basis for imposing a duty
to investigate, since such evidence will at times be unavailable
or conflicting. Moreover, the duty to investigate may conflict
with other duties imposed on the government. It could there-
fore be argued that the decision to follow up second-order evi-
dence should be entrusted to legislative discretion, since the
legislature is best able to balance the competing considerations
in a manner that will lead to a reasoned decision.
Even though this objection has some merit, it certainly
does not undermine the principle of active rationality itself.
When second-order evidence is fragmentary or hopelessly con-
flicting, courts should not rely on it in imposing a duty to inves-
tigate. Showing the existence of consistent second-order
evidence is the obligation of the person challenging the statute;
he must convince the court that there is good reason to believe
a law is irrational. In addition, the government can avoid the
obligation to re-research a statute simply by controverting the
petitioner's second-order case.206 Finally, a consideration not
to be overlooked is that the nature of the duty imposed by sec-
ond-order evidence is not always adverse to the government's
self-interest. The government might carry out the inquiry and
find that the results actually support the statute. When, as
here, the imposition of a duty is as likely to benefit as to bur-
den the person upon whom it is imposed, courts need not insist
206. The government may show that even though the inquiry could prove
fruitful, there are countervailing reasons why it should not proceed. These rea-
sons could include physical hazards posed by the inquiry itself, the inability to
use human test subjects, or inordinate expense. See generally Delgado & Mil-
len, supra note 6, at 350-52. It cannot simply be assumed in every case, how-
ever, that the legislature considered such reasons before deciding not to carry
out further study. If there is no record indicating that the legislature consid-
ered these reasons, there is no basis for inferring that it did. See C. BLAcK,
supra note 98, at 148.
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on inordinate precision in the evidence upon which they base
the duty.
D. THE FINANCIAL BURDEN
Yet another objection to active rationality is that even if
the duty were based only on appropriate second-order evi-
dence, the ability of courts to impose the duty would be poten-
tially limitless. If the duty became too pervasive, legislatures
might find themselves devoting unreasonable amounts of
money to reexamining old statutes. This, of course, could be
accomplished only at the expense of the legislature's more
traditional pursuits.
The fault with this objection is that it is overly broad.
Every judicial decree forces someone to do something he does
not want to do, and usually it entails spending money.207 Thus,
it is hardly an insoluble objection to the judicial role proposed
here that it would force the government, upon a showing that it
had been derelict, to bestir itself and spend some money set-
ting matters straight.208 When courts announced that attorneys
for criminal defendants, transcripts for appeal, and expert wit-
nesses were to be provided as a matter of right, the expense
cast upon the government was enormous. In comparison, the
cost of requiring the government to reexamine a statute occa-
sionally for substantive defects is minimal. Moreover, the ex-
pense will occur on a one-time-only basis, while state-provided
counsel and the like are recurring expenses. The financial bur-
den of active rationality would be limited in other ways as well.
First, the duty to investigate would arise only when a petitioner
has made an extraordinary showing: that the government has
been put on notice of the seriously defective nature of the fac-
tual basis underlying one of its statutes, and yet has done noth-
ing. Second, courts would certainly limit their active
intervention to cases in which suspicious elements are pres-
ent209 and a failure to act would seriously undermine trust in
our system of laws.210 In short, courts would surely reserve
this power for cases of serious injustice.21 1
207. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 65, at 507.
208. Of course, not all the remedies that courts could employ in furtherance
of active rationality require that the government spend money. For instance,
suspension of a statute's operation until the government reexamines its factual
basis allows government the cost-free option of letting the statute lapse into
permanent unenforceability.
209. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
210. See text accompanying notes 104-111 supra.
211. There is little loss of legitimacy when minor regulatory statutes are
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Another aspect of the fiscal objection is that if statutes
must be rationalized, it should be the petitioners, not the gov-
ernment, who should foot the bill. Our legal system generally
requires that parties bear the cost of their own suit.2 1 2 Why
should challenges of the kind considered in this Article be
treated any differently? On one level, the answer is that the
government, by enacting criminal laws, has altered the status
quo. Fairness therefore requires that the government assume
the burden of repairing the statute.2 13 On a more practical
level, it would simply be unfeasible for most private litigants to
bear the cost of developing the type of new information re-
quired.2 1 4 Furthermore, within some areas the government
may actually prohibit private research into the subject matter
of the challenged statute. 215 In such a situation, the cost of re-
search to a private litigant includes far more than financial out-
lay, since he will be forced to break other laws to prove the
challenged law unconstitutional.
A final consideration for allocating the fiscal burden of re-
search to the government in our paradigm is the pattern by
which the aggregate benefits of active rationality would be dis-
tributed: society as a whole would benefit far more than any
individual litigant from a scheme designed to eliminate irra-
tional criminal laws. This consideration may in part explain
the courts' predilection for placing certain financial burdens of
litigation on the government where criminal matters are con-
slightly out of kilter. Thus, courts would dismiss as trivial challenges such as
one by a defendant prosecuted for violating a thirty-second stoplight, who
seeks to show that twenty seconds would probably be a much more rational in-
terval.
212. See Alyeska Serv. Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
("American rule" requires that parties bear the cost of their own suits).
213. This duty to be fair is a component of legitimacy; it is something that
citizens may rightly feel is the concomitant of entrusting certain powers to the
government.
214. See P. BREST, supra note 1, at 941 (since empirical research is often
"time-consuming and expensive," government is in a better position to bring re-
sources to bear in disputes relating to constitutional and legislative facts); P.
FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 87 (1949) (submission of the
Brandeis brief places on an advocate the burden of compiling "a mass of fac-
tual data"). In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held that the gov-
ernment may refuse to pay for the abortions of indigent women even though it
would pay their childbirth expenses. Decisions such as Maher undercut to a
certain extent the argument that courts should assign a burden to the govern-
ment if it appears that it is more efficient for the government to bear it. There
is, however, a significant difference between the facts of Maher and our active
rationality paradigm: the government is responsible for the plight of criminal
defendants in a way that it is not for pregnant women. That is, the government
creates criminal laws, but it does not create pregnancies.
215. See notes 6-7 supra.
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cerned, even though that tendency is virtually nonexistent in
civil matters. In other words, where the simple shifting of a mi-
nor financial burden could result in the immediate conferral of
broad social benefits, courts may prefer'this solution over one
that defers the benefits by forcing society to wait for a wealthy
private litigant to come along.
2 16
E. THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE
A final objection that could be made to active rationality is
that it would result in the government's being turned over to a
horde of Strangelovian, slide rule-wielding technocrats who
would issue decrees based on charts, tables, and computer
print-outs. Such decisionmakers would ignore the wisdom,
compassion, and common sense necessary to enlightened poli-
cymaldng.
217
This objection is unnecessarily alarmist. After all, sci-
ence-the methodical assembly of facts and testing of hypothe-
ses-is little more than an extension of our "common sense."
21 8
216. Courts have ordered states to supply indigent criminal defendants with
attorneys, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), expert witnesses or in-
vestigators, see People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); Annot., 34
A.L!R.3d 1256 (1970), translators and interpreters, see Safford, No Comprendo:
The Non-English-Speaking Defendant and the Criminal Process, 68 J. CimW. L. &
C. 15 (1977), and transcripts on appeal. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
(1956). The now discredited case of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) points out
the type of hardships that can be avoided if certain financial burdens are
shifted to the government. In Buck, the Court condoned the sterilization of a
borderline retardate to prevent the condition from being repeated in her prog-
eny-"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. Buck has never
been overruled, and many states still permit sterilization of the mentally re-
tarded and persons convicted of certain offenses. See Shaman, Persons Who
Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAro. LQ.
61, 74-77 (1978). If scientific literature existed that showed that further research
would prove that the sterilization of retardates serves no valid eugenic purpose,
it would hardly be fair for a court to continue sanctioning the sterilizations sim-
ply because no retardate wealthy enough to fund the research wished to chal-
lenge the law, In such a situation, the possibility of broad social benefits would
virtually require the court to shift the burden of research to the government.
217. For discussions of the current antipathy toward science that exists in
some quarters, see J. HALT, SCIENCE, COMMON SENSE, AND CRIMINAL LAW RE-
FORM 3 (1963); C. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES (1958) (mutual antagonism be-
tween humanists and scientists); Beresford, Lawyers, Science, and the
Government, 33 GEO. WASH. L REV. 181, 207-08 (1964); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30
N.Y.U. L REv. 150, 157-60 (1955); Cowan, Some Problems Common to Jurispru-
dence and Technology, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 3, 5-7 (1964); Curlin, Law, Sci-
ence, and Public Policy, in SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 40-41 (W.
Thomas ed. 1974); A New Distrust of the Experts, TIME, May 14, 1979, at 54. See
generally R. HoFsTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963).
218. K. PEARSON, THE GRAMMAR OF SCIENCE 6-7 (1892); see Loevinger,
Jurimetrics, Science in Law, in SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 12 (W.
Thomas ed. 1974). See generally P. BRIDGMAN, THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS
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The fear that common sense and science are somehow opposed
thus seems groundless. 219 So, too, is the concern that creating
a place for facts in policy-setting somehow reduces the space
available for values and feelings. Scientific findings will be rel-
evant to, but never conclusive of, legal norms and values; 220 at
most, they provide a basis for concluding that a given law or
mechanism should be modified or repealed. The fear, then,
that active rationality will bring about a tyranny of science has
little to support it.221
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article began by considering the predicament of a
criminal defendant who was unable to obtain effective judicial
review of the criminal statute under which he was charged,
even though he had second-order evidence of its irrationality,
because the government controlled access to the information
critical to his case. It then suggested that a reviewing court
faced with this situation might avoid injustice by imposing on
the state a duty to investigate the current rationality of the
questionable statute. The interest protected by such judicial
action was termed "active" or "developmental" rationality, and
an appropriate prima facie case and set of remedies were de-
vised for judicial implementation.
Whether courts should protect this interest, and the extent
to which they should do so, are ultimately meta-questions. It is
clear that having courts command total legislative rationality
would be unwise-the cost would be too great. Thus, the active
rationality concept should come into play only in sensitive situ-
(1929); C. CHURCHMAN, THEORY OF EXPERIMENTAL INFERENCE (1948); J. CONANT,
ON UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE (1947); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLuTIONS (1962); K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).
219. It is more accurate to say that common sense is shaped by science. In
earlier times, common sense told us our earth was flat and the center of the
universe. Common sense once also told us that there were witches and pos-
sessed persons. The mentally ill, epileptics, and persons with brain anomalies
were treated either as possessed by demons or as savants. Today, largely be-
cause of the discoveries of scientists, these are no longer part of our common
sense. More recently our "common sense" concerning homosexuals, drug ad-
dicts, and alcoholics has been in flux, partly because of new scientific percep-
tions of the physical bases of these conditions.
220. See text accompanying notes 152-172 supra.
221. In fact, one of the active rationality remedies exerts no direct coercive
power against the legislature to implement more scientific research, but simply
provides a more favorable atmosphere for change to take place through the
force of public opinion. See text accompanying note 150 supra (court may de-
cree that governmental barriers to private research be lowered, stimulating
public knowledge and debate of questions).
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ations. The problem is that even if this intrusion into the legis-
lative prerogative were kept to a minimum, it would require the
setting of an incrementally higher value on the process of judi-
cial review, a process which many people have charged is al-
ready overvalued. Nevertheless, active rationality is a value
that our society should regard highly; it is closely related to the
important social constructs of legitimacy and citizen participa-
tion in the political process, and it has historical roots in the
political values that underlie our legal system.
On a practical level, it would seem that we can no longer
avoid valuing active rationality. Some courts have at least rec-
ognized the problem; but as technology advances, the problem
of contrived arrearages in legislative rationality can only be-
come more glaring. The time has come, therefore, for courts to
decide just how much active rationality is worth.

